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Reproductive Technology and Stolen Ova:
Who is the Mother?
Rebecca S. Snyder*
Introduction
Unable to have children naturally, Loretta and Bacilli Jorge
of Corona, California decided to undergo fertility treatment,1 but
Mrs. Jorge still did not become pregnant.2 The fertility procedure
involved removing some of her ova.3 Mrs. Jorge, who did not in-
tend to donate her eggs to other women, signed a form directing
that she be the only one to use them.4 In 1989, medical records
showed that some of Mrs. Jorge's eggs were implanted into an-
other woman who became pregnant and gave birth to twins, a boy
and a girl.5 The Jorges filed a suit seeking custody of the chil-
dren,6 but no decision has been issued to date.
* J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, expected 1998; B.A. Trinity Uni-
versity, 1994. I am thankful to Carrie Benson Fischer for her role in shaping the
focus of this Note, to Kaitlin Hallett for her insightful comments and to Marya
McDonald for her editorial assistance. I am especially thankful to my parents,
Patricia and David Snyder, and to my brother, Paul Snyder, for their support and
prayers throughout the writing of this Note. I am also grateful to my mother for
suggesting this topic.
1. See Susan Kelleher & Kim Christensen, Fertility Patients Fight Over
Twins, THE ORANGE CouNTY REG., Feb. 18, 1996, at Al.
2. See Susan Kelleher, Family Feels Whole After the Birth of a Baby Boy, THE
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 4, 1997, at B1. The Jorges stopped the fertility treat-
ment in 1995. See id. Mrs. Jorge found out that she was pregnant without the aid
of fertility treatment in July 1996 and gave birth to a son in February 1997. See
id.
3. See Kelleher & Christensen, supra note 1, at Al.
4. See id.
5. See Susan Kelleher & Dave Parrish, Woman After Twins' Custody Meets
with Birth Mother, THE ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 2, 1996, at B1. There may be
other children produced from the eggs and sperm of the Jorges. See Kelleher, su-
pra note 2, at B1. Five of their frozen embryos, the product of the Jorges' sperm
and ova, were allegedly thawed in 1989. See id.
Dr. Ricardo Asch ran the University of California, Irvine Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, the fertility clinic that the Jorges used. See id. He admits that the
clinic sold eggs without the consent of the "donors," but contends he is innocent.
See id. Tei Ord, Asch's former chief biologist stated that Asch ordered that the
eggs be misappropriated. See Jill Smolowe, The Test-Tube Custody Fight: Victims
of the Irvine Stolen-Egg Scandal Go After Twins, TIME, Mar. 18, 1996, at 80, 80.
6. See Valeria Godines, A Baby of Their Own but Couple Says Legal Fight for
Law and Inequality
Over seventy women who received fertility treatment at the
same clinic as the Jorges were either inadvertent donors or recipi-
ents of stolen eggs or embryos.7 At least ten children are products
of reproductive material allegedly stolen by the doctors at the
clinic.8 As a result, over eighty lawsuits and at least three custody
suits have been filed against the university and doctors. 9
There are an estimated 5.4 million infertile couples in the
United States.' 0 Approximately 300,000 individuals are treated
for infertility each year." In 1993, close to 39,000 couples in the
United States attempted to create babies through various methods
of artificial reproduction not including artificial insemination. 2
From 1981 to 1995, over 40,000 couples in the United States be-
came parents using artificial reproduction techniques, and from
1982 to 1995, the number of infertility clinics increased from 5 to
315.13 The infertility industry grosses approximately $2 billion
annually.14
Many argue that reproductive technology devalues women, 15
takes advantage of poor women' 6 and presents a host of other ethi-
Twins Continues, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Feb. 4, 1997, at Al.
7. See Kelleher & Parrish, supra note 5, at B1. Embryos, which are the prod-
uct of sperm and ova, can be frozen by using a technique known as cryopreserva-
tion and saved for future attempts at in vitro fertilization. See Gina Maranto, Em-
bryo Overpopulation, Sci. AM., Apr. 1996, at 16, 16. Michael Tucker, scientific
director at Reproductive Biology Associates in Atlanta, estimated that there are
approximately one million embryos stored worldwide, including at least 100,000 in
the United States. See id. at 18. This number is expanding as many couples want
to keep their embryos frozen for longer than five years. See id. at 16.
8. See Kelleher, supra note 2, at B1.
9. See id. The university settled two of the lawsuits in 1996 for $1.1 million.
See id.
10. See Karen Brandon, Emerging Fertility Clinic Scandal Has Californians
Rapt, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1996, § 1, at 6.
11. See Geoffrey Cowley, Ethics and Embryos, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 1995, at
66, 67.
12. See id. The first test-tube baby, Louise Brown, was conceived in 1978 in
England through in vitro fertilization (lVF). See Denise Grady, How to Coax New
Life, TIME, Fall 1996, at 37, 37.
13. See Cowley, supra note 11, at 67.
14. See id.
15. See generally GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE (1985) (arguing that the
artificial reproduction industry is part of a system of male supremacy and that the
industry devalues women); Michelle Stanworth, Reproductive Technologies and the
Deconstruction of Motherhood, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER,
MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 10 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987) (arguing that re-
productive technologies enable men to gain control over motherhood).
16. See Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood
in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 534 (1996).
There is widespread concern that genetic parents, typically occupying
a higher socioeconomic status, will take advantage of poor, unedu-
cated women in the surrogacy bargaining process. The unequal bar-
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cal concerns.' 7 Nonetheless, as insurance coverage increases for
methods of assisted conception, the use of artificial reproduction
continues to grow.' 8 Consequently, thousands of children will be
born as a result of these technologies. Inevitably, some of these
children will be caught in the middle of tense custody battles be-
tween the child's two biological mothers when the genetic mother's
ova are used without her consent. Therefore, legal standards must
be established that will best protect children in this situation.
In such a complex area, it is necessary to define the terminol-
ogy used. The following are definitions of terms as they are used
in this Note. A "genetic mother" is the woman who supplied the
egg from which the child was created. The genetic mother does
not carry the child in her womb. A "gestational mother" is the
woman who carries in her womb the child created from the egg of
the genetic mother.1' Both the genetic and gestational mothers
gaining power of the parties, commentators fear, will produce grossly
one-sided agreements that favor the genetic parents at the expense of
the surrogate.
Id.
17. See Hilary Rose, Victorian Values in the Test-tube: The Politics of Repro-
ductive Science and Technology, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER
MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 167-68 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987) (recognizing
that the availability of pre-conception sex-selection may place undue pressure on
women to have abortions in many countries); Stanworth, supra note 15, at 23
(noting that some people view IVF as an "assault[ ] on marriage and family"). The
societal impact of eugenics, which is the "science of the improvement of the human
species by genetic means," also presents important concerns. PATRICIA SPALLONE,
BEYOND CONCEPTION: THE NEW POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 133-54, 199 (1989); see
also Stanworth, supra note 15, at 28 (noting that some people fear reproductive
technology as a "tool[ ] for encouraging the propagation of the 'superior', [sic] or for
reducing the numbers of hereditary unfif').
18. Some states have passed legislation requiring fertility treatments, includ-
ing in vitro fertilization, to be a covered expense under insurance policies generally
or under policies that provide pregnancy-related coverage. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§
23-85-137, 23-86-118 (Michie 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-536 (West 1994);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431:10A-116.5, 432:1-604 (1995); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356m
(West 1995). Some states mandate coverage for fertility treatment, but exclude in
vitro fertilization. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 1994); CAL.
INS. CODE §§ 10119.6, 11512.28 (West 1994). Others define "basic health care
service" to include treatment for infertility. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-31-102
(1)(h)(v) (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1742.01(A), 1742.03(c)(1)(b) (Banks-
Baldwin 1995); W. VA. CODE § 33-25A-2(1) (1995).
19. Generally, the term gestational mother refers to the surrogate who intends
to surrender parental rights to the genetic parents. See Alexa E. King, Solomon
Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context of Collaborative Reproduction, 5
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 329, 341 (1995). A gestator who intends to raise the child is
known as the "mother" while the woman supplying the egg is called the ovum do-
nor. See id. This Note refers to the woman who performs the gestative function as
the gestational mother regardless of her intent and to the woman who supplies the
eggs as the genetic mother. This is because in the case of stolen reproductive ma-
terial, it is not clear which woman is the "mother."
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are "biological mothers. 20 An "adoptive mother" is a woman who
intends to raise a child produced from donated ovum and carried
in a gestational surrogate's womb. A woman who is genetically
related to the baby and carries it in her womb, but who becomes
pregnant through assisted reproduction and intends to give the
baby to another couple, is a "traditional surrogate." "Collaborative
reproduction" refers to the process of using the gametes 21 and
womb of three people to create a baby, who may or may not be
raised by adoptive parents who are not genetically or gestationally
related to the child.22
In the absence of applicable statutes, courts have used a vari-
ety of standards in adjudicating custody disputes in cases where
the child was created through artificial reproduction involving a
traditional surrogate mother and, in cases where the child has two
biological mothers, a gestational and genetic mother.23 However,
as of this writing, no court has issued a decision regarding a cus-
tody dispute involving a child's two biological mothers where the
reproductive material was either stolen or mistakenly used.
Where either the egg or womb was knowingly donated, courts have
used two standards to resolve custody disputes between two bio-
logical mothers: the intent doctrine and the genetic test.2 4 The
first is unworkable when the case involves stolen reproductive ma-
terial25 and the second operates to treat children as possessions.26
Due to the growth of artificial reproduction and the possibility of
mistakes27 and illegal activity on the part of infertility clinics, 28
20. "Biological" means "pertaining to, caused by, or affecting life or living or-
ganisms." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 180 (2d ed. 1985).
21. A gamete is a reproductive cell capable of uniting with another reproduc-
tive cell in the process of fertilization. See BLAKISTON'S GOULD MEDICAL DIc-
TIONARY 543 (4th ed. 1979).
22. As defined in this Note, adoptive parents, who intend to raise the child but
who are not biologically related to the child, are included as participants in col-
laborative reproduction.
23. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (using the intention
of the contracting parties regarding who would raise the child to determine to
which biological parent to grant custody of a child carried by a gestational surro-
gate); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (using the best interests of the
child standard to determine with which biological parent the child should live: the
surrogate mother or the biological father and his wife); Belsito v. Clark, 644
N.E.2d 760 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1994) (holding that the genetic relationship is determi-
native of legal parentage).
24. See infra notes 132-71 and accompanying text.
25. See infra beginning of Part II (explaining that no common intent would be
present between two biological mothers if the ova were stolen).
26. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
27. For example, through IVF performed in the Netherlands, Wilma Stuart
gave birth to twins who had different fathers. See Dorinda Elliott & Friso Endt,
[Vol. 16:289
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there is a potential for more couples to find themselves in the posi-
tion of the Jorges. As a result there may be a tremendous, nega-
tive impact upon the lives of the children in this situation.
This Note will examine which standard should be used to de-
termine whether the gestational or genetic mother should be rec-
ognized as the legal mother of a child who is the product of an
ovum or an embryo used without the consent of the genetic
mother.29 This Note will also discuss whether the non-custodial, or
non-legal, mother has any rights with respect to the child.
Part L.A of this Note briefly describes the methods of collabo-
rative reproduction which enable the two biological elements of
motherhood, genetics and gestation, to be separated.30 Part I.B.1
discusses two issues: (1) whether exercising the right to procreate
establishes any parental rights in the procreators; 31 and (2)
whether collaboratively reproducing constitutes an exercise of the
right of procreation. 32 Part I.B.2 discusses the fundamental rights
of parents and the aspects of parenthood from which they are de-
rived.33 Part II analyzes three competing standards for establish-
ing maternity in the context of stolen or mistakenly-used genetic
material: genetics, gestation and the best interests of the child. 34
Under the first two standards, the parents' interests are central to
the outcome, and the child is treated as a possession of either the
genetic or gestational mother rather than a legally-cognizable in-
dividual.3 5 Under the last standard, often referred to as the "best
Twins-with Two Fathers, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1995, at 38, 38. The most probable
explanation is that a technician reused a pipette containing some sperm from a
prior insemination. See id.
28. The temptation to implant a woman's fertile eggs into another woman
without the consent of the woman from whom the eggs came is high as this indus-
try is very lucrative. See Lisa Gubernick & Dana Wechsler Linden, Tarnished
Miracle, FORBES, Nov. 6, 1995, at 98, 98-101. The average cost per cycle of IVF is
$8000. See id. at 100. The cost of delivering a baby conceived through IVF ranges
from $66,667 for a couple that conceives after the first attempt to $800,000 if the
woman is over 40 years old and attempts IVF six times before becoming pregnant.
See id.
29. In the case of a stolen or mistakenly-used embryo, the genetic father has
interests very similar to those of the genetic mother. His interests may be
stronger, however, because he is the child's only biological father. Due to the
unique situation of the two biological mothers, this Note focuses on the three sepa-
rate elements of parenthood in mothers rather than fathers. The father's interests
are relevant in determining custody and assigning parental rights.
30. See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 83-106 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 108-71 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 172-268 and accompanying text.
35. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.
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interests of the child" standard, the child's interests are para-
mount. 36
Adopting the best interests of the child standard, this Note
concludes that in an action challenging maternity, there should be
a presumption that the caretaker of the child, who is usually the
gestational or adoptive mother, is the child's legal mother once the
infant-mother bond is formed.37 The non-custodial mother may be
awarded visitation rights if she establishes that visitation is in the
best interests of the child.38 If the action is concluded during
pregnancy, or when the baby is very young, it is not necessarily in
the best interests of the child to live with its gestational or adop-
tive mother because the child does not yet have a strong attach-
ment with the gestational or adoptive mother.39 In this situation,
the court should decide the dispute by answering the question:
'With which mother would it be in the child's best interests to
live?"
I. Background
A. Methods of Collaborative Reproduction
Several methods of artificial reproduction enable a woman to
carry a baby produced from another woman's egg. The following
assisted reproduction techniques can create a pregnancy by using
one man and one woman or one man and two women. In vitro fer-
tilization (IVF) is the fertilization of a woman's egg (ovum) with a
man's sperm in a petri dish.40 Once the fertilized egg divides and
becomes multicellular, it is implanted into a woman's uterus.41 Al-
36. See infra Part II.C.
37. See discussion infra notes 293-302 and accompanying text (reasoning that
this will minimize the potential harm to the child's development).
38. See discussion infra notes 289-90.
39. If the action begins during the pregnancy, it might last longer than the du-
ration of the pregnancy, such that by the time a decision is reached the child may
have formed a bond with the gestational or adoptive mother.
40. See Stephanie F. Schultz, Surrogacy Arrangements: Who are the "Parents"
of a Child Born Through Artificial Reproductive Techniques?, 22 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 273, 274 (1995); Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation:
Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOwA L. REV. 265, 269
(1995). To induce superovulation which facilitates egg removal, women are given
fertility hormones. The eggs are surgically removed through a procedure called
laparoscopy or through aspiration, which is a less risky process. See Developments
in the Law: Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1537 n.73
(1990) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
41. See Developments in the Law, supra note 40, at 1538. The embryos are im-
planted in the woman's uterus when they are at the two to sixteen cell stage. See
OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL
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ternatively, after fertilization, the embryo can be frozen for later
implantation. 42 This technique is cryopreservation. 43 IVF has re-
sulted in more than 26,000 births in America.44 There are at least
three other methods by which eggs are removed from a woman's
body and then implanted into her or another woman's uterus in an
attempt to create a pregnancy: gamete intrafallopian transfer
(GIFT),45 zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT)46 and immature egg
harvest.47
Collaborative reproduction can involve up to five adults: a
sperm donor, an egg donor, a gestator, and two nonbiologically re-
lated individuals intending to raise the child. 48 Two women can be
involved in the creation of a child in at least three situations. 49
First, a woman may donate eggs that, upon fertilization, will be
implanted into the uterus of an infertile woman who intends to
raise the child.50 Second, a woman intending to raise the child
who is carried by a gestational surrogate may provide the eggs.5 1
Third, a couple intending to adopt the child arranges for a surro-
CHOICES 123 (1988).
42. See Maranto, supra note 7, at 16. The term ovum donation is used when
the genetic mother does not intend to raise the child. See King, supra note 19, at
340.
43. See ROBERT SNOWDEN ET AL., ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION: A SOCIAL IN-
VESTIGATION 22-23 (1983).
44. See Grady, supra note 12, at 37.
45. GIFT is the process by which an egg and sperm are inserted into a
woman's fallopian tube. See Grady, supra note 12, at 38; SPALLONE, supra note 17,
at 56. If the sperm fertilizes the egg, creating an embryo, the resulting embryo
travels into the uterus naturally. See Grady, supra note 12, at 38.
46. In ZIFT the egg and sperm are mixed in a lab to achieve fertilization, as in
IVF. See Grady, supra note 12, at 38. The resulting zygotes are placed in the
woman's fallopian tube. See id. A zygote is an organism produced by the union of
two reproductive cells. See BLAKISTON'S GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note
21, at 1496.
47. Conception through immature egg harvest is achieved through the same
methods as IVF, except immature rather than mature eggs are harvested from the
woman. See Grady, supra note 12, at 38.
48. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims
of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 355 (1991). Hill
includes a chart showing the 16 different combinations capable of producing a
child through artificial reproduction. See id. The 16 combinations are the product
of varying the source of the male gametes (whether by husband or third-party
sperm donor), the source of the female gametes (whether by wife or third-party egg
donor), the location of fertilization (whether in the wife, the laboratory, or the sur-
rogate host), and the site of gestation (either in the wife or the surrogate). See id.
49. See Anne Goodwin, Determination of Legal Parentage in Egg Donation,
Embryo Transplantation, and Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 26 FAM. L.Q.
275, 276 (1992).
50. See id. at 276-77.
51. See id. at 277.
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gate to carry a child produced by donated eggs, which do not be-
long to the surrogate or the adoptive mother.52
B. The Law on Procreation and Parental Rights
Before determining the strength of each mother's claim for
recognition as the legal parent, the source of parental rights
53
should be identified. This section will present the various events
and circumstances from which parental rights are derived.
1. The Right to Procreate
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,5 4 the Supreme Court stated that the
right to procreate is "one of the basic civil rights of man .. .fun-
damental to the very existence and survival of the race."55 This
right is derived from the right to privacy 56 stemming from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 7 The right to pro-
create includes the right to have a child, a positive right,58 as well
as the right to avoid pregnancy, a negative right. 59
Cleveland Board of Education v. Lafleur60 illustrates the
positive right of procreation. In that case, a teacher was forced to
take unpaid maternity leave with no guarantee that she would be
able to return to her job.61 Recognizing that there is a right "to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child," the Court held that the teacher's right to procrea-
tion was unjustifiably infringed. 62 The Court's holding implies a
52. See id.
53. For a partial list of parental rights, see infra text accompanying note 119.
54. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
55. Id. at 541. The Skinner Court struck down a statute that called for the
sterilization of habitual criminals. See id. at 535.
56. The right to privacy stems from the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965).
57. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
58. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. The positive right to procreate is the right to
have a child.
59. The negative right was established in a series of cases dealing with access
to contraceptives. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 678 (holding that minors have a right of
access to contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438 (1972) (holding
that unmarried individuals have the right of access to contraceptives); Griswold,
381 U.S. at 479 (establishing the right, among married couples, to use contracep-
tives).
60. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
61. See id. at 636-37.
62. Id. at 640 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453). Apart from the holding in
LaFleur, the language quoted from Eisenstadt implies that the right to procreate is
[Vol. 16:289
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positive right to procreation because the teacher must become
pregnant before maternity leave is possible.63
a. Whether the right to procreate includes at least some
limited parental rights
It is unclear whether the right to procreate includes parental
rights with respect to the child as well as the right to biological re-
production. 64 Those arguing that it includes parental rights note
that procreation seems to be of little value if the progenitors do not
acquire the right to parent the child.65
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re Baby M.,66 held that
the right to procreate does not include the right to raise the child,67
but suggested it encompasses other parental rights.68 In Baby M.,
Mary Beth Whitehead entered into a surrogacy contract in which
she agreed to be artificially inseminated with William Stern's
sperm, relinquish her parental rights and deliver the child to Mr.
and Mrs. Stern for $10,000.69 After the baby was born, Mrs.
Whitehead decided she would not relinquish her parental rights. 70
The Sterns filed a suit seeking termination of Mrs. Whitehead's
parental rights and sole legal custody of Baby M.71 The Sterns as-
serted the right to procreate, and Mrs. Whitehead claimed the
right to the companionship of the baby.7 2
The court stated that the right to procreate "is the right to
have natural children, whether through sexual intercourse or arti-
ficial insemination."73 Under this definition, the court concluded
not limited to avoiding procreation, but includes the right to choose to bear a child.
See Roger J. Chin, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues in Procreation,
8 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 190, 208 (1996).
63. See Chin, supra note 62, at 208.
64. See Hill, supra note 48, at 367.
65. See id. at 368; Chin, supra note 62, at 213.
66. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1987).
67. See id. at 1253-54.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80 (explaining that Mrs. Whitehead
was entitled to visitation because she was the child's biological parent).
69. See 537 A.2d at 1235.
70. See id. at 1236. Upon giving up her baby, Mrs. Whitehead could not eat,
sleep or concentrate. See id. She told the Sterns of her desire to regain custody of
the baby. See id. Fearing that she would commit suicide, the Sterns agreed to let
her have Baby M. for one week. See id. Mrs. Whitehead fled to Florida with Baby
M., and the child was not returned to the Sterns until four months later. See id.
71. See id. at 1237.
72. See id. at 1253. The court did not address Mrs. Whitehead's claim because
it concluded that she was the child's legal mother and the right to companionship
with one's child is a parental right. See id. at 1253, 1255.
73. Id. at 1253. The court did not address Mrs. Stern's right to procreate be-
cause it found the surrogacy contract to be illegal. See id. at 1240. Thus, it is un-
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that both Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead had exercised the right to
procreate.7 4 While the court recognized that "the custody, care,
companionship, and nurturing that follow birth" may be afforded
constitutional protection, it held that those rights "are not part of
the right to procreation" because different interests are relevant
for defining rights which affect the resulting child.75 Therefore,
the right to custody does not arise from exercising the right to pro-
create.7 6 The court resolved the custody issue by applying the best
interests of the child standard.77 The court granted custody to Mr.
Stern78 and visitation rights to Mrs. Whitehead.7 9
Despite the court's conclusion that procreating does not enti-
tle one to custody of a child, by finding that Mrs. Whitehead was
entitled to visitation, the court suggested that being a biological
parent is sufficient to give one some limited aspects of parental
rights.8 0 Analyzing the scope of the right to procreate reveals that:
[t]he right of procreation elaborated in Baby M. is analogous
to that possessed by noncustodial parents: it includes the
minimum rights to take part in certain fundamental child-
rearing decisions, to visit the child, to bring an action modi-
fying the custody award, and the duty to provide child sup-
port. In short, exercising the right of procreation is sufficient
to make one a "parent" in the legal sense.81
The court's decision did not provide a practical test to deter-
mine what elements must exist in order to be a procreator. In de-
ciding that Mrs. Whitehead was the legal mother, the court simply
stated that she had exercised the right to procreate.82
b. Whether collaborative reproduction is an exercise of the
right to procreate
There are two main differences between collaborative repro-
duction and sexual reproduction. First, collaborative reproduction
clear whether the right to procreate extends to an infertile person through the use
of artificial reproduction or, in other words, whether a biological connection is nec-
essary to be a procreator.
74. See id. at 1253-54.
75. Id. at 1253. The court did not specify the constitutional provision from
which these rights flow.
76. See id. The court focused on the best interests of the child, rather than the
rights of the parents, because "a person's rights of privacy and self-determination
are qualified by the effect on innocent third persons of the exercise of those rights."
Id.
77. See id. at 1256.
78. See id. at 1256-61.
79. See id. at 1261-63.
80. See Hill, supra note 48, at 369.
81. Id.
82. See Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1254.
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does not involve sexual intercourse. 83 Second, collaborative repro-
duction, unlike sexual reproduction, is not rooted in history and
tradition because it involves relatively new scientific technology
and requires the gametes and womb of more than two people to
create a child.84
The legal impact of the first difference is uncertain because it
is unclear whether the right to procreate is limited to coital repro-
duction.8 5 Elements of sexual liberty and procreative choice com-
bine to form the rationale for recognizing the right to use contra-
ceptives. 86 The Supreme Court has not determined, however,
whether the right to procreate without sexual intercourse is con-
stitutionally protected or, in other words, whether there is a right
to engage in collaborative reproduction.8 7
Carey v. Population Services International8 8 suggests that
sexual activity is not protected apart from procreation.89 In Carey,
the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy gives minors the
right of access to contraceptives.9 0 Carey clarified that sexual lib-
erty was not the only reason for holding that restrictions on the
distribution of contraceptives must serve a compelling state inter-
est:
[W]e do not hold that state regulation must meet this
[compelling interest] standard "whenever it implicates sexual
freedom" or "affect(s) adult sexual relations" but only when it
"burden(s) an individual's right to decide to prevent concep-
tion or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access
to the means of effectuating that decision." As we observe
below, "the Court has not definitively answered the difficult
question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohib-
its state statutes regulating (private consensual sexual) be-
83. See supra notes 40-42, 45-48 and accompanying text; Chin, supra note 62,
at 202.
84. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (explaining the different
ways to create a child involving three adults); see also Chin, supra note 62, at 214
(arguing that the introduction of a third party surrogate into the reproductive
process removes surrogacy from the category of values protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
85. See Hill, supra note 48, at 367; see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,
791 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting) (asserting that the right to procreate
should extend to infertile persons); John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and
Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 939, 960 (1986) (arguing that the right to procreate should extend to noncoi-
tal means of reproduction).
86. See Chin, supra note 62, at 202; see also supra note 50 (stating the holdings
of the right to contraception cases).
87. See Chin, supra note 62, at 202-03.
88. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
89. See Chin, supra note 62, at 203.
90. See 431 U.S. at 678.
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havior among adults," and we do not purport to answer that
question now. 91
Furthermore, Bowers v. Hardwick,9 2 a case involving homo-
sexual sodomy, suggests that sexual activity, without a demon-
strated connection to marriage, family or procreation is not suffi-
cient to implicate privacy interests under the Due Process
Clause.9 3 The Bowers Court held that there is no constitutionally
protected right to engage in sodomy.9 4 Whether the right to pro-
create is dependent upon the presence of other factors, such as coi-
tal sexual activity, is unclear. 95
The conclusion in Carey that sex is given the greatest consti-
tutional protection when procreative rights are implicated sug-
gests that collaborative reproduction may be protected under the
right to privacy.96 Collaborative reproduction is closer to the inter-
ests in Carey than those in Bowers because it involves the decision
whether or not to create a family.
Nevertheless, the opposite conclusion may be reached as well.
First, Carey suggests that the scope of constitutional protection for
sexual activity is unclear, but that when it is combined with the
negative right of procreation, avoiding pregnancy, it receives
maximum constitutional protection. It does not necessarily follow
that the positive right to procreate, producing a baby, without in-
tercourse is protected by the right to privacy. Furthermore, the
right to privacy may not be sufficient to protect the right to pro-
create even though the right of procreation is generally considered
a privacy right. 97 This is because exercising the right to procreate
depends upon the cooperation of others, while exercising the right
to privacy does not.98
The second difference between sexual reproduction and col-
laborative reproduction is that the latter is not rooted in history
and tradition. The Supreme Court is generally reluctant "to ex-
tend the right of privacy to new relationships and activities" be-
91. Id. at 688 n.5 (citations omitted); see Chin, supra note 62, at 203 ("lIlt is
questionable whether sexual liberty, separated from procreation, is adequate to
raise a claim of substantive due process.").
92. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
93. See id. at 191.
94. See id.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87 (discussing the right of procrea-
tion).
96. See supra text accompanying note 91 (explaining that the government
must satisfy the highest level of scrutiny when it burdens an individual's decision
whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy).
97. See Hill, supra note 48, at 383-84.
98. See id. at 384.
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cause of the importance of history and tradition.99 The Supreme
Court focuses on the values of the activity as rooted in history and
tradition, rather than historical practices, in determining whether
constitutional protection is warranted. 100 Although technology by
itself does not alter the values of procreation, 10 1 the introduction of
a third party into the reproductive process changes the social un-
derstanding of procreation. Therefore, collaborative reproduction
may not be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'102 Viewed
this way, history and tradition do not support constitutional pro-
tection of collaborative reproduction.
Apart from the sexual aspect, commentators argue that pro-
creation can be divided into three elements: genetic, gestational
and social. 10 3 The social aspect is the intent to raise the child as
one's own.10 4 Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts
99. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (stating that history and
tradition should govern which relationships and activities are protected by the
Constitution). In Bowers, the Court emphasized the role of history and tradition in
establishing substantive Due Process rights:
[The Court is not] inclined to take a more expansive view of [its] authority
to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution .... There should be,
therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of those
Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to
itself further authority to govern the country without express constitu-
tional authority.
478 U.S. at 194-95.
100. See Chin, supra note 62, at 202; see also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122-23
(emphasizing the importance of the values of history and tradition). In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the Court noted that rights guaranteed by substantive Due
Process are not limited to historical practices:
It is also tempting ... to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects
only those practices defined at the most specific level, that were protected
against government interference by other rules of law when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified. But such a view would be inconsistent
with our law. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter .... Neither the
Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substan-
tive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.
505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992) (citations omitted).
101. A couple's interest in noncoital reproduction is the same as in coital repro-
duction where the same couple provides the genetic, gestational and social ele-
ments of procreation. See Robertson, supra note 85, at 960. Because this form of
assisted reproduction does not introduce any third parties, it is a form of assisted
reproduction consistent with the traditional values underlying procreation. See id.
102. See Chin, supra note 62, at 214 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)).
103. See id. at 209-10.
104. See id. at 210. Courts often refer to this element as intent. See id. In the
1998]
Law and Inequality
have addressed the issue of whether the exercise of any one or a
combination of these three elements is an exercise of the right to
procreate. The lower courts, however, have used these elements to
decide custody disputes between two biological mothers. 105 These
decisions suggest that genetics, gestation and the intent to raise
the child as one's own are also the elements of parenthood. In two
of these cases, the courts held that the legal mother was the
woman who exhibited two of the three elements. 10 6 While one
court held that genetic motherhood is determinative, this holding
also resulted in recognizing the woman who possessed two of the
three elements--genetics and intent/social--as the legal mother. 07
2. Parental Rights
a. Parents'fundamental rights with respect to their children
Paternal rights in Colonial and nineteenth-century America
paralleled the rights of property owners. 108 The rights of a prop-
erty owner included the right to use or transfer one's property and
the right to exclude others from one's property. 0 9 Similarly, under
the patriarchal theory of parental rights, children were treated "as
remainder of this Note, this element is referred to as "intent/social."
105. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (considering the allo-
cation of genetics, gestation and intent to create and raise the child in determining
the child's legal mother); McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1994)
(basing the decision on the allocation of genetics, gestation and intent among the
child's two mothers); cf. Moschetta v. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App.
1994) (finding that intent to raise the child, as agreed to in a traditional surrogacy
contract, is irrelevant where the intending mother does not also possess the ge-
netic or gestational element).
106. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); McDonald v.
McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478-80 (Sup. Ct. 1994); infra notes 133-42 and ac-
companying text (discussing cases where the courts considered the three elements
of procreation).
107. See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 761 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1994); infra notes
143-49 and accompanying text (discussing the decision of the Belsito court).
108. See Jacobus Ten Broek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Ori-
gin, Development, and Present Status (Part I), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 287 (1964)
("Feudal law did not recognize the family as such or assign rights and duties to its
members by virtue of membership. Property rights were the only privileges which
the king's courts would enforce between father and son."); see, e.g., Campbell v.
Wright, 62 P. 613, 614 (Cal. 1900) (finding that a father's right to custody of his
child is a property right; see also Carrol Leavell, Custody Disputes and the Pro-
posed Model Act, 2 GA. L. REV. 162, 166 (1968) (explaining that courts in early
American cases treated children as various forms of property interests); Paul
Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 672, 674-75 (1942)
(explaining that courts' notions of custody were similar to property interests such
as "possession" or "title").




assets of estates in which fathers had vested interests .... [T]heir
services, earnings, and the like became the property of their pa-
ternal masters in exchange for life and maintenance."' 10
Until the mid-1880s parents could give up their right to the
child's labor by transferring the right to a master via a formal in-
strument of indenture or apprenticeship."' In exchange, the mas-
ter agreed to provide the child with food, clothing and a vocational
education. 112 The parents also had the right to prevent others
from interacting with their children by exercising sole custody or
control." 3 For example, a parent could seek damages for the se-
duction of a daughter or refuse to grant a suitor permission to
marry a daughter. 114
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, social
changes initiated a shift in the rationale in custody disputes from
the father's property right in the child to the best interests of the
child. 115 As more men worked outside of the home, fathers became
less involved in households." 6 At the same time, affection became
more important than status to domestic bonds." 7 This resulted in
the recognition of a mother's role in rearing her children and a
concern for the welfare of children." 8 Meanwhile, the doctrine of
110. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 25 (1985); see Barbara Bennet Woodhouse, "Who
Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 995, 1045 (1992) (explaining that the child's labor was a productive asset that
the father was entitled to utilize in farming, caring for younger children, etc.); see,
e.g., Eustice v. Plymouth Coal Co., 13 A. 975 (Pa. 1888) (upholding parent's right to
receive his or her child's wages).
111. See STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 15-16 (1988). However, at common law paren-
tal rights were unalienable and inviolable; thus, they were not transferable as
were property rights. See Naomi R. Cahn, Refraining Child Custody Decisioninak-
ing, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6 (1997).
112. See MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 111, at 15-16.
113. See Woodhouse, supra note 110, at 1046.
114. See id.; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 110, at 45 (noting that while a fa-
ther could receive damages for the seduction of his daughter, which was sexual
intercourse outside of wedlock, a daughter could not because the law did not rec-
ognize that she had suffered a loss).
115. See GROSSBERG, supra note 110, at 234-43; Judith T. Younger, Responsible
Parents and Good Children, 14 LAw & INEQ. J. 489, 497 (1996) (discussing the
changing focus of courts in custody cases).
The focus on the child's interests was first manifested in the "tender years"
presumption in which living with her mother was presumed to be in the best in-
terests of a very young child. GROSSBERG, supra note 110, at 240-42.
116. See GROSSBERG, supra note 110, at 7.
117. See id. The definition of a parent shifted to "one who forms a child's mind
rather than one who brings a child into the world." Id. at 237 (citations omitted).
118. See id. at 235.
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parens patriae"1 9 expanded, allowing courts to bypass the paternal
biases of the common law.' 20
In the 1920s, the Supreme Court recognized that the Four-
teenth Amendment' 2' protects the parent-child relationship. In
two landmark decisions, the Supreme Court recognized that par-
ents have the right to educate their children in the manner they
choose without governmental interference. 122  Specifically, in
Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a statute that imper-
missibly interfered with the right of parents to control their chil-
dren's education. 123 Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the
Supreme Court held that a state statute was unconstitutional be-
cause it impermissibly infringed upon the parents' liberty in
shaping their child's development. 124 These cases are cited for the
proposition that the Constitution protects the parent-child rela-
tionship. 125
Today, a parent has an interest in "the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children."'126 Parental
rights include the right to: physically possess one's child through
either visitation or custody rights; make decisions regarding the
child's education and health; control and discipline one's child;
manage the child's earnings and property; and, teach moral stan-
dards, religious beliefs and elements of good citizenship. 127
119. Parens patriae "refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign ...acting
on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the principle that
the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors
who lack proper care and custody from their parents." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1114 (6th ed. 1990).
120. See GROSSBERG, supra note 110, at 236-37.
121. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
122. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
123. See 262 U.S. at 400-01. The statute at issue made it illegal to teach foreign
languages or to teach subjects in foreign languages to children below eighth grade.
See id. at 400.
124. See 268 U.S. at 534. The statute required the attendance of young children
in public school. See id.
125. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983) (stating that in "[Meyer
and Pierce] the Court found that the relationship of love and duty in a recognized
family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protection."); see, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972) (holding that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments prohibit a State from requiring Amish parents to send their
children to high school until age 16 if the children graduated from the eighth
grade).
126. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
127. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989); Virginia Mixon
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Parental rights are limited in at least two circumstances.
First, if a parent is declared unfit as defined by state statute, pa-
rental rights may be terminated. 128 Procedural protections af-
forded by the Due Process Clause require notice and a hearing
129
and at least clear and convincing evidence that a parent is unfit
3 0
before termination of parental rights. Second, courts generally
allow only two people to exercise parental rights with respect to
any one child. 131
Swindell, Children's Participation in Custodial and Parental Right Determina-
tions, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 659, 679 (1994);
128. See Swindell, supra note 127, at 680-82. Grounds for termination include
"child abuse, abandonment, neglect, dependency, inability to provide care due to
incarceration and general unfitness." Id. at 682.
129. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 655-57.
130. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-68 (1982).
131. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Prenise of the Nuclear Family Has
Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 883 (1984); see, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. 110
(recognizing two legal parents and denying rights to the biological father, even
though he had a personal relationship with the child); see also Cahn, supra note
111, at 2 (noting that courts recognize only two legal parents in cases involving
surrogacy and unwed fathers).
There are, however, several exceptions to the notion that a parent's control
over the child is exclusive. First, based upon the doctrine of parens patriae the
State may require education at certain ages, require vaccines and limit child labor.
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). Second, all fifty states have
enacted legislation giving grandparents the right to visit their grandchildren, but
they differ on the circumstances in which visitation rights should be granted. See
Anne Marie Jackson, The Coming of Age of Grandparent Visitation Rights, 43 AM.
U. L. REV. 563, 564, 568 (1994). Some state courts have held grandparent visita-
tion statutes unconstitutional. See Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271, 1276 (Fla.
1996) (ruling that granting visitation rights to grandparents violates the "parents'
fundamental right to raise their children" founded in the Florida Constitution ex-
cept "where the child is threatened with harm."); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d
769, 773 (Ga. 1995) (holding that the Georgia Grandparent Visitation Statute im-
permissibly interfered with parental rights, as guaranteed by the state and federal
constitutions, and that visitation must be limited to instances where "failing to do
so would be harmful to the child"); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993)
(holding that the Grandparents Visitation Act is unconstitutional under the state
constitution and that a showing of harm is necessary before visitation rights may
be granted). The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari in two cases
that affirmed grandparent visitation rights over the objection of the child's adop-
tive and biological parents. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992) (granting
a grandfather visitation rights over the objections of the child's biological parents),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992); H.F. v. T.F., 483 N.W.2d 803 (Wis. 1992)
(granting visitation rights to grandparents despite adoption of the child by the
stepfather), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992). The courts in six other states have
also upheld grandparent visitation statutes. See Lehrer v. Davis, 571 A.2d 691
(Conn. 1990); Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Spradling v.
Harris, 778 P.2d 365 (Kan. 1989); Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993);
Ridenour v. Ridenour, 901 P.2d 770 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995); Michael v. Hertzler, 900
P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1995).
Finally, open adoption serves as an exception to the rule of exclusive parental
rights. Open adoption is "the sharing of information and/or contacts between the
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b. Aspects of parenthood giving rise to parental rights
In order to determine who a child's legal parents are, courts
analyze the different elements of parenthood. Two lower court
opinions suggest that motherhood is comprised of genetics, gesta-
tion and the social role or intent of the two biological mothers. 132
In Johnson v. Calvert, the court gave great weight to the in-
tent/social element of parental rights when there are two biological
mothers of one child.133 This case involved a dispute between the
genetic and gestational mothers, both of whom sought recognition
as the child's legal mother. 34 Finding that each mother presented
acceptable proof of maternity under California law, the Supreme
Court of California held that when the gestational and genetic re-
lationships do not "coincide in one woman, she who intended to...
bring about the birth of a child that [sic] she intended to raise as
her own-is the natural mother."'135 The court reasoned that sig-
nificant weight should be given to the important role of the in-
adoptive and biological parents of an adopted child, before and/or after the place-
ment of the child, and perhaps continuing for the life of the child." Marianne
Berry, Risks and Benefits of Open Adoption, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 125, 126
(Richard E. Behrman ed., 1993). Courts in seven states enforce these agreements
(California, Delaware, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico and Wash-
ington). See Tammy M. Somogye, Opening Minds to Open Adoption, 45 U. KAN. L.
REV. 619, 623 (1997). Additionally, eight states allow private open adoption
agreements, but do not enforce them (Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey and Tennessee). See id. at 622-23. However, open
adoptions may not be entirely inconsistent with the notion of exclusive parental
control as the adoptive parents consented to contact or information sharing be-
tween their child and the biological parent(s) in the adoption agreement. See id. at
622.
132. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); McDonald v.
McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478-80 (Sup. Ct. 1994). But see Belsito v. Clark, 644
N.E.2d 760, 766-67 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1994) (relying only on the genetic factor to de-
termine parental rights).
133. See 851 P.2d at 782.
134. See id. at 778. A contract existed between the parties which stated that
the genetic mother was the intended social mother of the child. See id.
135. Id. at 782. The intent doctrine established in Johnson is contract based.
Under this test, the legal parents are those who agreed, prior to the pregnancy, to
raise the child. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, a
model statute, also bases motherhood in surrogacy agreements on the intentions of
the parties. § 8(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 206 (West Supp. 1997). Concerns about prevent-
ing children from being treated as commodities, the best interests of the child and
the exploitation of women led several states to enact statutes governing surrogacy
contracts. In Michigan, for example, surrogate contracts for compensation are
void. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 (West 1993); see also Doe v. Attorney
Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 489 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a surrogate parent-
age contract for compensation is unlawful).
Despite public policy concerns, this test is the most functional in the absence
of legislation because it allows the parties to create a family in a myriad of ways
without imposing a legal definition of parenthood that is inconsistent with the con-
tribution (or lack thereof) that the parties wish to make in raising the child.
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tending parents in the procreative process when one woman does
not provide both gestational and genetic elements: "[W]hile all of
the players in the procreative arrangement are necessary in
bringing a child into the world, the child would not have been born
but for the efforts of the intended parents .... [T]he intended par-
ents are the first cause, or the prime movers, of the procreative
relationship."'136 The court indicated that the creation of the par-
ents' "mental concept of the child" is equated with conception.
137
Adopting the reasoning of Johnson, the Supreme Court of
New York, in McDonald v. McDonald,'38 held that intent to be the
child's social mother is determinative when genetics and gestation
do not exist in one woman. 139 Olga McDonald was the gestational
and social mother of twins in McDonald.140 In a divorce action, her
husband, who was the biological father of the twins, attempted to
gain sole custody by arguing that his wife was not their legal
mother because she was not genetically related to the twins.
141
The genetic mother of the twins did not seek parental rights. The
court recognized Olga McDonald as the legal mother because she
intended to raise the children. 142
136. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (quoting Hill, supra note 48, at 415). The court
further elaborated that:
[the Calverts] affirmatively intended the birth of the child, and took the
steps necessary to effect in vitro fertilization. But for their acted on inten-
tion, the child would not exist. Anna agreed to facilitate the procreation of
Mark's and Crispina's child. The parties' aim was to bring Mark's and
Crispina's child into the world, not for Mark and Crispina to donate a zy-
gote to Anna. Crispina from the outset intended to be the child's mother.
Although the gestative function Anna performed was necessary to bring
about the child's birth, it is safe to say that Anna would not have been
given the opportunity to gestate or deliver the child had she, prior to im-
plantation of the zygote, manifested her own intent to be the child's
mother. No reason appears why Anna's later change of heart should viti-
ate the determination that Crispina is the child's natural mother.
Id.
137. Id. at 783.
The mental concept of the child is a controlling factor of its creation, and
the originators of that concept merit full credit as conceivers. The mental
concept must be recognized as independently valuable; it creates expecta-
tions in the initiating parents of a child, and it creates expectations in so-
ciety for adequate performance on the part of the initiators as parents of
the child.
Id. (quoting Andrea E. Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Repro-
ductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 196 (1986)).
138. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994).
139. See id. at 480 (finding the Johnson court's reasoning to be "persuasive").
140. See id. at 478.
141. See id. at 478-79.
142. See id. at 478.
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In Belsito v. Clark, 43 the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio re-
jected the intent-based approach in Johnson and adopted a test
based solely on the existence of a genetic relationship. 144 In Bel-
sito, Shelly Belsito was the intended mother and the genetic
mother. 145 Mrs. Belsito and her husband, the biological father,
sought a declaratory judgment establishing that they were the le-
gal parents of the child. 146 Carol Clark, the gestational surrogate,
did not seek parental rights.147
The court held that Mrs. Belsito was the child's legal and
biological mother because she provided its genetic material. 148 In
supporting its conclusion, the court stated that:
[T]here is abundant precedent for using the genetics test for
identifying a natural parent .... The genetic parent can guide
the child from experience through the strengths and weak-
nesses of a common ancestry of genetic traits. Because that
test has served so well, it should remain the primary test for
determining the natural parent, or parents, in nongenetic-
providing surrogacy cases.149
Despite this statement, the court failed to explain why a ge-
netic link alone is determinative when genetics and gestation are
separated between women. The court neither addressed argu-
ments for using gestation as the determinative factor nor provided
reasons for rejecting a gestational standard other than asserting
that a genetic standard is superior. 5 0 The court rejected John-
son's intent test partly because it "subordinat[es] the consent of
the genetic-providing individual to the intent to procreate of the
[gestational] surrogate who intends to keep and raise the child."' 5'
143. 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1994).
144. See id. at 766.
145. See id. at 761.
146. See id. at 762.
147. See id. at 767.
148. See id. The court explained that the term "natural parent' means that the
child and parent share the same blood line. Id. at 762. Today the genetic relation-
ship, which is equivalent to a "blood relationship," is evidentiary support in estab-
lishing parentage. See id. at 763. The court also stated that the gestational par-
ent did not have any parental rights because the gestational parent did not
"contribute to the genetics of the child" and the genetic parent did not waive her
parental rights. Id. at 766.
149. Id. The court asserted that the genetic test is already established as the
"primary test" for determining maternity when there are two biological mothers.
However, it failed to support this assertion.
150. See id. at 767 (stating that the genetic parents were the natural parents in
cases where an embryo is implanted in the surrogate by means of in vitro fertiliza-
tion).
151. Id. at 766. There were two other reasons the Belsito court rejected the rea-
soning of Johnson. First, the intent test is difficult to apply because intent can be
difficult to prove. See id. at 764. Second, the test violates public policy in two
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The Belsito court emphasized that "the replication of the
unique genes of an individual should occur only with the consent
of that individual."' 152 This statement indicates that the Belsito
court misunderstood how the Johnson intent test determines the
legal parent. When there is a surrogacy agreement, the gesta-
tional mother's intent never operates to subordinate the consent of
the genetic mother because the parties' pre-conception agreement
is controlling. 153 In the case of stolen or mistakenly-used repro-
ductive material, however, the genetic parents do not have the op-
portunity to consent to the use of their genes. Thus, the Belsito
court's concern that one's genes will be replicated without consent
is valid when applied in this context.
These cases illustrate that neither genetics nor gestation
alone determines who is the legal mother. Although Belsito holds
that genetics is determinative, its reasoning is unconvincing. In
evaluating the persuasiveness of the court's reasoning, it should be
noted that the genetic mother was also the intended mother and
the gestational mother did not seek parental rights.154
Prior to the focus by state courts on genetics and gestation,
the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the third
aspect of parenthood, the intent/social element. 155 This factor has
the most impact when determining whether unwed fathers have
parental rights. Several Supreme Court cases addressing the pa-
rental rights of unwed fathers combine to form the general princi-
ple that if the fother is not married, the biological father may se-
cure constitutional protection of his parental rights by establishing
ways. See id. at 765. Specifically, surrogacy arrangements generally involve one
woman surrendering her parental rights by agreement and sometimes for a fee.
See id. This violates the public policy against surrendering parental rights via
private contract. See id. The intent test also undermines established adoption
laws resulting in a violation of public policy. See id. Ohio adoption laws require
that the biological mother be given an "unpressured opportunity" to surrender her
parental rights, that the child's interests be protected by close supervision of the
adoptive process, and that the adoption process promote stability in the adoptive
parent-child relationship. See id. Finding that the surrogate is similar to an adop-
tive parent, the court ruled that the intent test does not address the concerns un-
derlying the adoption process. See id.
152. Id. at 766.
153. See id.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
155. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S.
816 (1977). "[Ihe importance of the familial relationship... stems from the emo-
tional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the
role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children,
[citation omitted] as well as from the fact of blood relationship." Id. at 844
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)).
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a relationship with his child.156 However, if the father fails to es-
tablish a personal relationship, then constitutional protection of
his parental rights may eventually terminate. 157
Despite the importance the Court gives to the personal rela-
tionship between a father and his child, the Court does not con-
sider the intent/social element if the mother was married to an-
other man when the child was born. 158 In this situation, the Court
adopts a bright line rule: the biological father does not have a con-
stitutional right to establish paternity or any parental rights re-
gardless of his relationship with the child. 15 9 In contrast, the
marital status of the mother does not affect her parental rights. 60
156. See Hill, supra note 48, at 375-76. This general rule emerges from an ac-
cumulation of several cases. See id. (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261
(1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)); cf. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261
(stating that "the mere existence of a biological link does not merit' the same con-
stitutional protection that would be afforded to a father who established a rela-
tionship with his child); Caban, 441 U.S. at 392 (explaining that states may allow a
child whose parents are unwed to be adopted without the consent of a parent who
has not participated in raising the child); Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 246 (holding that a
state may deny an unwed biological father the authority to oppose the adoption of
his child who was born out-of-wedlock if he never supported the 11-year-old child
or took steps to legitimize it); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645 (holding that a statute
which declared children born out-of-wedlock wards of the state upon the mother's
death violates the unwed father's Due Process and Equal Protection rights by pre-
suming the father unfit because his children were born out-of-wedlock).
157. See cases cited supra note 156; Hill, supra note 48, at 376.
158. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128-30 (1989).
159. See id. In some states, including California, Oklahoma and Oregon, the
presumption of legitimacy is irrebuttable. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD 118-19 nn.12 & 19 (1988). In the majority of states where the pre-
sumption of legitimacy is rebuttable, the presumption can only be rebutted by the
mother or her husband. See Hill, supra note 48, at 372-73 (explaining that third
parties cannot bring actions to establish paternity).
The principle established in Michael H. is generally cited for the proposition
that preserving the traditional family outweighs a biological father's parental
rights. It also is interpreted as allowing the child's interests to override those of
the biological father. See Cahn, supra note 111, at 32. The latter interpretation is
not supported by the Court's decision, however, as no inquiry was made into the
best interests of the child.
160. See Cahn, supra note 111, at 37. Historically, parental rights were affected
by marital status. Thus, custody rights of married parents against third party in-
terference were virtually absolute while the rights of unmarried parents were not
exclusive. See id. at 5.
More recently, in the three cases that determined whether the genetic or ges-
tational mother had parental rights, the courts focused on the distribution of the
three elements of parenthood among the mothers. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851
P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1994);
McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994). The marital status of
the mothers was not considered in those cases. See Johnson, 851 P.2d 776; Belsito,
644 N.E.2d 760; McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477.
Although in each of those cases the end result was that a traditional family re-
[Vol. 16:289
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Taken together, these rules stand for the proposition that genetics
alone is not determinative of paternal rights and that the existence
of a personal relationship is an important factor in determining
whether an unwed biological father has parental rights.
Similarly, genetics alone is not determinative of legal mater-
nity. 161 However, genetics and gestation together are determina-
tive. When these two elements exist in one woman, the in-
tent/social element is generally found to be irrelevant.' 62 In In re
Baby Girl Clausen,163 for example, Michigan's Supreme Court or-
dered that the prospective adoptive parents, the DeBoers, return
the baby girl to her genetic parents because the parental rights of
the biological father had not been terminated. 164 The court or-
dered this even though the child lived with the prospective adop-
tive parents for more than two years while the litigation pro-
ceeded. 165
Arguing that the child should not be returned to her biologi-
cal parents, the prospective adoptive parents contended that they
had a "protected liberty interest in their relationship" with the
baby girl, Jessica. 166 Based upon U.S. Supreme Court cases ad-
ceived custody of the child, it is not clear from the facts of the cases that the child
would not be living in a traditional family had the court given legal parental status
to the other mother. Furthermore, the factors that the Supreme Court has relied
upon in preserving the child's nuclear family are not relevant in the context of
collaborative reproduction. These factors include the state's interest in preserving
the marital union and the lack of basis in history and tradition for awarding pa-
rental rights to unwed fathers. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125-30. The first in-
terest is not implicated in the context of collaborative reproduction because the
child is not the product of marital infidelity as she was in Michael H.
161. Cf. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (relying on the social aspect of parenthood to
determine parental rights); McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80 (adopting the rea-
soning of Johnson, 851 P.2d 776).
162. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (1988) (holding that the in-
tended mother, who was not the gestational or genetic mother, did not have a valid
claim to legal maternity because the surrogacy contract was invalid due to con-
flicts with existing statutes and public policy); In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
893, 894 (Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to recognize a traditional surrogacy contract
where the surrogate is the gestational and genetic mother because the court found
that intent is irrelevant in the context of traditional surrogacy). These cases dem-
onstrate the intent/social element is generally irrelevant unless the social mother
also has a genetic or gestational connection to the child. But see Twigg v. Mays,
No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624, at *6, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993) (holding
that changing custody of a child from the man who raised her to her biological par-
ents, who took the wrong baby home from the hospital at her birth, would be det-
rimental to the child).
163. 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
164. See id.
165. See Nancy Gibbs et al., In Whose Best Interest?, TIME, July 19, 1993 at 44.
166. 502 N.W.2d at 663.
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dressing the parental rights of unwed fathers, 167 the prospective
adoptive parents argued that it is the relationship which invokes
constitutional protection of parental rights rather than the exis-
tence of a biological connection. 168
Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court of Michigan ex-
plained that the cases addressing the rights of unwed fathers pro-
vide a justification for denying parental rights to an unwed fa-
ther.169 The cases do not establish that third parties obtain
parental rights by developing a parental relationship with the
child. 170 The U.S. Supreme Court declined to stay the state court
order. 17 1
Thus, while the existence of a personal relationship with the
child can be a significant factor in determining who should be the
parent as between different genetic and gestational mothers,
raising the child for his or her entire life is not determinative of
parenthood by itself. Cases addressing the genetic, gestational
and intent/social elements of parenthood suggest that parental
rights are derived from all three elements of parenthood and that
no single element or combination thereof is sufficient for the at-
tachment of parental rights.
167. See id.; see also supra note 156 and accompanying text (describing several
cases that establish the principle that an unwed father's parental rights would
eventually terminate if he did not establish a personal relationship with his child).
168. See In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 663.
169. See id. at 664.
170. See id. In In re Kirchner, a case with strikingly similar facts to the custody
dispute of Baby Jessica, the unwed mother of a baby boy gave him up for adoption,
but the father was told by the mother's friends and relatives that the child died at
birth. See 649 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ill. 1995). The court held that the father's paren-
tal rights were not legally terminated; thus the adoption was invalid and the child
was given to the father. See id. at 328-29, 340. Subsequently, the father moved
out after he and his wife separated. See Father in Custody Crusade Living Away
From Family, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1997, at Al.
171. See DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1993). The Supreme Court did
not speak to the reasoning of the Michigan Supreme Court, however.
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II. Analysis of Competing Doctrines for Assigning Parental
Rights in the Context of Collaborative Reproduction
Without the Genetic Mother's Consent
If the parties involved never reach an agreement as to who
should raise the child, how should legal parenthood be defined?
When the genetic mother's eggs are used without her consent, the
biological parents do not have an understanding of the role each
will take in the child's life. In the case of the Jorges, Mrs. Jorge
intended to bring a child into the world using her eggs, but she did
not intend to allow another woman to contribute to this process. 172
From the outset, however, the gestational parents of the twins,
allegedly produced from Mrs. Jorge's eggs, also intended to raise
them. Because both biological mothers exhibited the intent/social
element, the Johnson intent test is inapplicable in this situation.
When there was never one purpose in common between all
the mothers, should legal parenthood be based on genetics, gesta-
tion, intent, or another factor? The problem with rejecting intent
as the determinative factor is that it is the only one of the three
elements of parenthood and procreation that does not treat the
child as a possession. In searching for a more equitable standard
and one which promotes the welfare of children, the best interests
of the child standard is the most appropriate. 173
A. The Genetic Standard
Under the genetic-based test, the parents who are geneti-
cally-related to the child are his or her legal parents. 174 Three
principal arguments support this test in the context of artificial
reproduction without the consent of the genetic mother. 75 The
first argument involves the strength of the natural bond between
the genetically-related parent and child.' 76 Some adopted chil-
dren, for example, have a strong desire to reunite with their bio-
logical parents. 77 This desire exemplifies the power of the genetic
172. See Kelleher & Christensen, supra note 1, at Al; supra notes 1-5 and ac-
companying text (explaining the circumstances surrounding Mrs. Jorge's unin-
tended egg donation).
173. See infra notes 275-79 and accompanying text (reasoning that other stan-
dards disserve children as a class as well as the individual child).
174. See Schultz, supra note 40, at 285.
175. See Scott B. Rae, Parental Rights and the Definition of Motherhood in Sur-
rogate Motherhood, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 219, 228-31 (1994).
176. See id.
177. See id. at 228-29. The reunion of an adoptee and birth parent is an
"integral event in" the adoptee's life. ARTHUR D. SOROSKY, THE ADOPTION
TRIANGLE 157 (1978). It allows questions about the past to be answered and gives
19981
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bond 78 without reducing the impact of the social parents. 179 One
court noted the "fact that another person is, literally, developed
from a part of oneself can furnish the basis for a profound psycho-
logical bond. Heredity can provide a basis of connection between
two individuals for the duration of their lives."'18 0 Thus, propo-
nents argue that if both mothers' claims with respect to the child
are equal, the genetic parents should raise the child because
bonding between the parent and child is greatly intensified when
there is a genetic as well as a social connection.18'
The second argument in favor of a genetic standard is that
the parents' genes determine the "makeup" of the child.182 Genes
are determinative of the child's physical characteristics and
traits.183 Scientific evidence strongly suggests that social practices
are predicated on genetics. 84 The argument maintains that the
the adoptee a "feeling of wholeness." Id.
178. See Rae, supra note 175, at 229.
179. Some proponents of this view argue that if the child does not know his or
her identity, then the child will "feel a sense of psychological rootlessness" result-
ing in "psychological harm." Hill, supra note 48, at 403. Predicting that the child's
curiosity about his or her biological heritage will affect his or her self-identity,
however, confuses the child's concept of his or her self-identity with knowledge of
his or her biological heritage. See id. at 404.
180. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 380-81 (Ct. App. 1991). The simi-
larities between a parent and child provide a unique bond between them. See
SOROSKY, supra note 177, at 159, 171 (recounting the story of a young adoptee
elated to hear that her biological mother's voice sounded like "a tape recording of
[herself]"). This bond also gives the parent a sense of immortality by passing on a
piece of his or her self to descendants. See ROBERT J. LIFTON, THE LIFE OF THE
SELF 32 (1983).
181. See Rae, supra note 175, at 229-30; see also Hill, supra note 48, at 390
(stating that it is natural for law to "preserve as a family unit that which nature
has rendered genetically similar").
182. See Rae, supra note 175, at 228.
183. See id.; see also Auke Tellegen et al., Personality Similarity in Twins
Reared Apart and Together, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1031, 1035-36
(1988) (arguing that genetic diversity attributes to personality differences more
than environmental diversity and that a common environment among twins plays
a "very modest role in the determination of many personality traits"). But see W.
MISCHEL, INTRODUCTION TO PERSONALITY 311 (3d ed. 1981) (stating that "[tlhrough
social learning, vast differences develop among people in their reactions to most of
the stimuli they face in daily life"). One adoptee was amazed at the similarity be-
tween himself and his biological mother:
Here, we had been reared in totally different worlds. She: Latin, in a
farm community, from working-class people, never having left the state.
I: British-raised all over the world, nannies, boarding schools, etc. Yet,
we were so alike. We laughed the same, we walked the same, and we had
the same mannerisms. We even crossed our legs the same way when we
sat down, and we raised our eyebrows in a similar way.
SOROSKY, supra note 177, at 174-75.
184. See Hill, supra note 48, at 390. "Psychological dispositions and personal
proclivities," such as spousal preference and occupational choice, may be at least
partially determined by genetics. Id. If "physical processes which underlie psy-
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gestational mother's prenatal contribution is caring for and feed-
ing the child during pregnancy. 8 5 The argument assumes that the
child's physical features would be exactly the same irrespective of
the gestator 86 Because genetics is so determinative of the iden-
tity of the child, proponents of this argument contend that it
should be the standard for determining maternity. 187
However, the fact that the child shares the genes of her par-
ents is, by itself, an insufficient factor on which to base parental
rights for two reasons. 88 First, this theory would give siblings pa-
rental rights over each other. 8 9 This counterargument, however,
fails to address the fact that a child is a part of his or her parents
in a way that he or she is not a part of his or her siblings in that a
child is not created from the siblings' genetic material. 190 Second,
chological functioning" are inheritable, "a child with a psychological propensity
toward learning may be reinforced in her pursuits by a mother with a similar dis-
position." Id. at 390 n.200.
185. See Rae, supra note 175, at 228. Proponents of the gestation standard ar-
gue that the genetic test should be rejected because it devalues the contribution of
the gestational mother. See Coleman, supra note 16, at 517; see also BARBARA K
ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PA-
TRIARCHAL SOCIETY 36-37 (1989) (reviewing the historical place of women as moth-
ers).
The old patriarchal kinship system had a clear place for women: they
were the nurturers of men's seeds, the soil in which seeds grew, the
daughters who bore men offspring. When forced to acknowledge that a
woman's genetic contribution is equal to a man's, Western patriarchy was
in trouble. But the central concept of patriarchy, the importance of the
seed, was retained by extending the concept to women....
... Women do not gain their rights to their children in this society as
mothers, but as father equivalents, as equivalent sources of seed.
Id. In her dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Calvert, Justice Kennard recognized
that:
[a] pregnant woman's commitment to the unborn child she carries is
not just physical; it is psychological and emotional as well .... [She
is] more than a mere container or breeding animal; she is a conscious
agent of creation no less than the genetic mother, and her humanity
is implicated on a deep level. Her role should not be devalued.
851 P.2d 776, 797-98 (Cal. 1993).
186. See Rae, supra note 175, at 228. This assumption is untrue, however, be-
cause the gestational mother could have a negative impact on the child's physical
appearance and bodily functions if the mother consumes substances such as to-
bacco, alcohol or drugs. See id. at 237.
187. See id. at 228.
188. See Hill, supra note 48, at 391. Basing parenthood on the genetic relation-
ship alone would confer parental rights to a rapist in cases where a child is born.
See Victoria L. Fergus, An Interpretation of Ohio Law on Maternal Status in Ges-
tational Surrogacy Disputes: Belsito v. Clark, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 229, 241
(1994). This point can be dismissed, however, if rape is considered a circumstance
that prohibits the attachment of parental rights or if maternity is defined differ-
ently than paternity.
189. See Hill, supra note 48, at 391.
190. The discussion on property rights in one's genetic material addresses
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the physical act of providing the sperm or ovum does not
strengthen the claim to parental rights. 19' Although sperm donors
are generally denied parental rights, donating an egg requires
more "physical involvement and risk."'192 Arguing that the mother
should have parental rights because of her ovum donation, how-
ever, is basing the claim on physiological and physical involve-
ment, rather than genetic contribution alone, and it is essentially a
claim that her contribution to the child's development creates a
property right in the child.' 93
The third argument supporting the genetic-based test is one
of property rights. Under this argument, one possesses property
rights in the products of one's body and in anything derived there-
from. 94 The argument maintains that because a baby is a product
of a person's egg or sperm, the provider of the reproductive mate-
rial has property or quasi-property rights in the resulting child. 195
Although no cases have addressed the issue of property rights in
sperm or ova maturing into parental rights, three cases have dealt
with property rights in reproductive material.
In York v. Jones, the Yorks requested that the Jones Institute
transfer their frozen embryo to California and the institute re-
fused. 96 The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
held that the cryopreservation agreement "created a bailor-bailee
relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants,"'197 implying
that the Yorks had a property right in the frozen embryo.
198
In Davis v. Davis, a divorced couple fought over the custody
of their seven frozen embryos. 199 The Supreme Court of Tennessee
held that "preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or
whether such rights translate into parental rights over the resulting child. See
infra text accompanying notes 194-95.
191. See Hill, supra note 48, at 390-91.
192. Id. at 390. Drugs that induce superovulation which facilitates egg retrieval
cause serious side effects including swelling, nausea, diarrhea, stomachaches and
weight gain. See Developments in the Law, supra note 40, at 1540 n.99. There are
also risks of overstimulation and burst ovaries and possible death. See id.
193. See Hill, supra note 48, at 390-91. If the basis for determining parenthood
is physical involvement, the gestational mother has a greater claim than the ge-
netic mother.
194. See Hill, supra note 48, at 391.
195. See id.
196. See 717 F. Supp. 421, 424 (E.D. Va. 1989).
197. A bailor is a "party who... delivers goods to another party who holds them
in trust for the bailor." BLACK'S, supra note 119, at 141-42.
198. York, 717 F. Supp. at 425. The court did not address whether individuals
possess property rights in ova or sperm. Thus, this decision is limited to property
rights in embryos.
199. See 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to
special respect because of their potential for human life."200 The
couple does not have a "true property interest"201 in the embryos,
but "they do have an interest in the nature of ownership to the ex-
tent that they have decision-making authority concerning disposi-
tion of the preembryos. '2 °2
In Hecht v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court re-
lied on Davis to hold that the sperm depositor "had an interest, in
the nature of ownership, to the extent that he had decision making
authority as to the use of his sperm for reproduction." 20 3 Under
the California Probate Code, this interest fit into the definition of
property, 204 but in other states, it may not be a property interest
depending on the language of applicable statutes.20 5
In York, the property interest existed in the gamete donors-
bailors as against the clinic-bailee. 20 6 It is not clear that the court
would find parental rights in the genetic parents, derived from
their property interest in the embryo, as parents cannot possess a
property right in children because "children are not property."20 7
They are people. In the holdings of Davis and Hecht, the gamete
provider, at the least, has decision-making authority. To claim
that such authority translates into parental rights with respect to
the resulting child is a tenuous argument. Although producing a
child from a woman's ovum without her consent is a violation of
her procreational autonomy, 20 8 declaring the genetic mother to be
the legal mother is not necessarily the appropriate remedy.
If the genetic mother's only cause of action with respect to the
child is for a violation of her decision-making authority over the
ovum or embryo, then she is most likely limited to one of two
200. Id. at 597.
201. Id. Those arguing that the embryo is property take the view that it "has a
status no different from any other human tissue. With the consent of those who
have decision-making authority over the preembryo, no limits should be imposed
on actions taken with preembryos." Id. at 596 (quoting Report of the Ethics Com-
mittee of the American Fertility Society, 53 J. AM. FERTILITY SOC'Y, 34S-35S
(1990)).
202. Id. at 597.
203. 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 283 (1993).
204. See id.
205. See Jennifer Long Collins, Hecht v. Superior Court: Recognizing a Property
Right in Reproductive Material, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 661, 670 (1995).
206. See id. at 669.
207. Hill, supra note 48, at 392.
208. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the right,
among married couples, to avoid procreating); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (finding that the decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child is fundamental to individual autonomy).
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strategies. The first is an action for conversion against the clinic
or physician.209 The second is an argument that the strength of
the bond between the genetic parent and child warrants granting
custody to the genetic parents. 210
B. The Gestational Standard
At common law, giving birth gives rise to a presumption of
motherhood. 211 This presumption is based on the ancient dictum,
mater est quam demonstrate, which means by gestation the mother
is demonstrated. 212 It is possible, however, that consanguinity is
the basis for parental rights in the common law and that gestation
was merely evidence of shared genes. 213 Accordingly, blood tests
are an acceptable method of determining maternity.21 4 Because
artificial reproduction was extremely rare when the common law
209. Under this argument, the ovum or embryo is a chattel:
(1) Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a
chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it
that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the
chattel.
(2) in determining the seriousness of the interference and the justice of
requiring the actor to pay the full value, the following factors are impor-
tant:
(a) the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or con-
trol;
(b) the actor's intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the
other's right of control;
(c) the actor's good faith;
(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the
other's right of control;
(e) the harm done to the chattel;
(f) the inconvenience and expense caused to the other.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965).
One who is authorized to make a particular use of a chattel, and uses it in
a manner exceeding the authorization, is subject to liability for conversion
to another whose right to control the use of the chattel is thereby seri-
ously violated.
Id. § 228.
The doctrine of accession does not apply in the case of stolen reproductive ma-
terial because the property must be taken in good faith or by innocent mistake for
the doctrine to apply. See Hill, supra note 48, at 392 n.209 (citation omitted). Un-
der that doctrine, the title of the chattel passes to the laborer when he substan-
tially changes or increases the value of the chattel, regardless of the original
owner's consent to the labor. See Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311 (Mich. 1871).
210. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text (presenting argument in-
volving the strength of the natural bond between the genetically-related parent
and child).
211. See Coleman, supra note 16, at 524.
212. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993).
213. See id. at 781-82.
214. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 12, 21, 9B U.L.A. 317 (1987).
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rule developed, courts most likely did not find it important to clar-
ify the rationale behind this rule.
Scholars present four main arguments for using gestation as
the defining factor of maternity. First, the gestational mother de-
votes much more of herself, physically and emotionally, to the
child by the time the child is born than the genetic mother. 215 Sec-
ond, research indicates that the gestational mother contributes to
the child's physical, psychological and emotional development
during pregnancy. 216 Two researchers, in separate studies, noted
that mothers looking forward to the birth gave birth to children
who were significantly healthier, both emotionally and physically,
than babies born to mothers who were not.217 One study found
that babies of women who were under severe stress during preg-
nancy have "gastro-intestinal problems, cry frequently, and are
perceived as having a difficult temperament."2 18  Gestational
mothers can also take affirmative steps to positively influence the
child's development.219 Researchers are uncertain whether prena-
tal teaching impacts the specific behavior of the child or whether it
affects the overall disposition of the child, but they are certain that
prenatal experiences do affect the child. 220 This evidence demon-
215. See Rae, supra note 175, at 236-37 (stating that carrying the child for nine
months and giving birth establishes a "sweat equity" in the child).
216. See id. at 237-42 (noting that the gestational mother contributes to the
"emotional makeup, temperament, and dispositions of the child, and in some cases
... to the child's physical form" which can be a negative contribution due to the
consumption of tobacco, alcohol, or drugs).
217. See THOMAS VERNY, M.D. & JOHN KELLY, THE SECRET LIFE OF THE
UNBORN CHILD, 47, 47-48 (1981). The 2000 women studied were from similar so-
cio-economic backgrounds, received similar prenatal care, and were of similar in-
telligence levels. See id. The only significant difference among the women was
their attitude toward the pregnancy. See id.
In Dr. Gerhard Rottman's study of 141 women, the healthiest babies were
born to mothers who wanted them both consciously and subconsciously. See id. at
48-49 (citing Gerhard Rottman, UNTERSUCHUNGEN UBER EINSTELLUNG ZUR
SCHWANGERSCHAFr UND ZUR FOTALEN ENTWICKLUNG, in GEIST UND PSYCHE (Hans
Graber ed., 1974)). By contrast, women with strong negative feelings toward the
pregnancy had a greater percentage of premature and low birth weight children
who exhibited inclinations toward emotional problems. See id. Women who had a
desire to have children at some point in their lives, but for whom the pregnancy
was untimely due to concerns such as the mother's career or finances, gave birth
to an uncommonly large number of lethargic and apathetic children. See id.
218. B.R.H. Van den Bergh, Ph.D., The Influence of Maternal Emotions During
Pregnancy on Fetal and Neonatal Behavior, 5 PRE- & PERI-NATAL PSYCHOL. 119,
127 (1990). The study was conducted by B.R.H. Van den Burgh, Ph.D., of the Cen-
ter for Developmental Psychology at the University of Leuvan, Belgium. See id. at
119.
219. See Rae, supra note 175, at 240-41.
220. See Peter Hepper, Fetal Learning: Implications for Psychiatry, 155 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 289, 292 (1989).
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strates that the gestational mother's contribution is not limited to
the role of an incubator.
These arguments resemble the genetic progenitor's claim that
property rights in gametes translate into parental rights over the
child.221 Essentially, the gestational mother is claiming that her
contribution to the child's development creates a property right in
the child.222 Thus, although the gestational mother has more
physical involvement with the child than the genetic mother, such
a claim fails because one cannot possess property rights in a
child.223
The third argument for utilizing gestation as the standard for
finding maternity involves the mother-infant bond and the infant-
mother bond. In some situtations, the mother's bond to the infant
develops as early as the end of the third month of pregnancy, 224
but research indicates that this bond does not always occur during
pregnancy. 225 Because the mother-infant bond is not an immuta-
ble aspect of pregnancy, the argument for using gestation as the
standard is weakened.226
It is critical to the child's development throughout life that he
or she form a bond with an adult at a very early stage in life. 227
There is no evidence indicating that the child must form this bond
with the gestational mother, however. Studies indicate that there
is no significant variation in the quality of the bond between adop-
tive and biological parent-child relationships. 228 Thus, the gesta-
221. See Hill, supra note 48, at 408-09; supra text accompanying note 195.
222. See Hill, supra note 48, at 408-09.
223. See supra text accompanying note 207 (explaining that parents have no
property rights in children).
224. See John C. Fletcher & Mark I. Evans, Maternal Bonding in Early Fetal
Ultrasound Examinations, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 392, 392 (1983).
225. See Kennel & Klaus, Mother-Infant Bonding: Weighing the Evidence, 4
DEV. REV. 275, 281 (1984). In a study of 97 new mothers, 41% first felt love for
their babies during pregnancy, 24% first felt love at birth and 8% first felt love af-
ter the baby was a week old. See id.
226. See Hill, supra note 48, at 398.
227. Infants who do not form a bond with an adult will likely have difficulties in
establishing "deep and enduring relationships later in life." See Hill, supra note
48, at 402; Leslie M. Singer et al., Mother-Infant Attachment in Adoptive Families,
56 CHILD DEV. 1543, 1544 (1985) (noting prior research of nonadoptive families
that indicates "a secure, emotional attachment to care givers ... is important for
healthy psychological adjustment ... in later childhood"). Infants generally begin
to form bonds around the age of three months. See L.J. Yarrow & M.S. Goodwin,
The Immediate Impact of Separation: Reactions of Infants to a Change in Mother
Figure, in THE COMPETENT INFANT: RESEARCH AND COMMENTARY, 1032, 1036-39
(Lawrence Joseph Stone et al. eds., 1973) (study of adopted infants indicated that
before three months few infants react to changes in their environment).
228. See Hill, supra note 48, at 402; Singer, supra note 227, at 1547.
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tional mother's claim that she is a more appropriate mother be-
cause of her ability to bond with the child229 or the child's ability to
bond with her is ill-founded. 230
The fourth argument for utilizing gestation as the standard
for maternity involves the gestational mother's emotional ties to
the child. When a mother is permanently separated from her child
she may experience "a deep sense of loss which pervades daily ac-
tivities."231  It does not follow, however, that the gestational
mother should be given priority on the basis of potential psycho-
logical harm occasioned by the relinquishment of her child.232 The
genetic mother may suffer psychologically as well, even if she has
not seen the child.233 Thus, the fact that the gestational mother
will undergo psychological trauma is a tenuous argument upon
which to base a claim to parental rights.
C. Best Interests of the Child Standard
The interests of the father and each mother, whether gesta-
tional or genetic, are important. Each person's contribution is es-
sential to bring the child into the world. Nevertheless, the child's
interests should not be subverted. Yet, under the tests previously
discussed, the child's interests are not considered. Under the best
interests of the child standard, however, the interests of the par-
ents are limited by their effect on the child.234 In cases where re-
productive material was stolen or mistakenly used, the interests of
the resulting child should be paramount rather than focusing ex-
clusively on the rights of the competing mothers.235 A proper ap-
229. If the ability of the mother to adequately bond with the child is not depend-
ent on gestating the child, then genetic and adoptive mothers have the same pro-
pensity to bond with the child as the gestational mother. See Singer, supra note
227, at 1550 (stating that "there is little reason to believe [adoptive parents'] at-
tachment relationships with their young infants will differ markedly from
nonadoptive parents").
230. See Hill, supra note 48, at 400, 403.
231. Hill, supra note 48, at 405.
232. See id. at 407.
233. Cf. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (recognizing Mr.
Davis' concern that if the preembryos created with his sperm were donated to an-
other couple, "he would face a lifetime of either wondering about his parental
status or knowing about his parental status but having no control over it").
234. See supra note 76 (stating that parental rights must be tempered by the
repercussions on the children involved).
235. See Douglas S. Irwin, Maternity Blues: What About the Best Interests of the
Child in Johnson v. Calvert?, 24 Sw. U. L. REv. 1277, 1292 (1995). "The child is an
innocent party, and his or her needs and concerns should prevail over those who
brought him or her into existence, regardless of any claims those individuals
claiming priority might have." Id.
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plication of the standard focuses solely on the interests of the
child.236
The most common application of the best interests of the
child standard is in resolving custody disputes. 237 In these cases,
the legal parents are already identified; the issue is how the pa-
rental rights should be divided among them. The best interests
standard is rarely used to determine which people possess paren-
tal rights, 238 which is an issue separate from determining the
rights possessed by a person who is already recognized as a parent.
In making a custody decision, the Supreme Court of Alabama
provided a comprehensive list of the pertinent factors of the best
interests of the child standard:
The... age of the children... the characteristics and needs of
each child, including their emotional, social, moral, material
and educational needs; the respective home environments of-
fered by the parties; the characteristics of those seeking cus-
tody; including age, character, stability, mental and physical
health; the capacity and interest of each parent to provide for
emotional, social, moral, material and educational needs of
the children; the interpersonal relationship between each
child and each parent; the interpersonal relationship between
the children; the effect on the child of disrupting or continuing
an existing custodial status; the preference of each child, if the
child is of sufficient age and maturity; the report and recom-
mendation of any expert witnesses or other independent in-
vestigator; available alternatives; and any other relevant mat-
ter the evidence may disclose. 239
236. See Suzette M. Haynie, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to
Child Custody is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REV. 705, 721 (1986).
"[C]ourts frequently allow [the child's best interests] to be diluted by other consid-
erations that reflect the interests of one or both parents or the state." Younger,
supra note 115, at 516.
237. All states currently apply a best interests standard to resolve custody dis-
putes between divorced or separated parents. See Rene R. Gilliam, When a Surro-
gate Mother Breaks a Promise: The Inappropriateness of the Traditional "Best In-
terests of the Child" Standard, 18 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 514, 518 (1988). A few
states apply this standard to adjudicate custody disputes between biological par-
ents and third parties. See R.A.D. v. M.E.Z., 414 A.2d 211 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980);
Costigan v. Costigan, 418 A.2d 1144 (Me. 1980); Stanley D. v. Deborah D., 467
A.2d 249 (N.H. 1983); Patzer v. Glaser, 368 N.W.2d 561 (N.D. 1985); Elm v. Key,
480 P.2d 104 (Wyo. 1971). At least one court used the best interests of the child
standard to determine the custody of a child in a dispute between a traditional
surrogate mother and the child's biological father. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d
1227 (N.J. 1987).
238. See infra note 245 (identifying courts that declined to use this standard in
cases involving parental rights). But see Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993
WL 330624, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993) (applying the best interests of the
child standard in holding that biological parents did not have any parental rights).
239. Exparte Divine, 398 So.2d 686, 696-97 (Ala. 1981).
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This standard's copious factors allow for much judicial discre-
tion. Critics of this test argue that it is "arbitrary, vague and over-
reaching."240 They further contend that "the tendency... is to ap-
ply intuition in deciding that a child would be 'better' with one set
of parents than with another, and then to express this intuitive
feeling in terms of the legal standard of being 'in the best interests
of the child."'241 Scholars have proposed variations of this stan-
dard, 242 but these variations are just as indeterminate as the best
interests standard. 243 For lack of a better alternative, courts con-
tinue to apply the best interests of the child standard to custody
disputes.
In custody disputes between biological parents, each parent
has an equal claim to custody, and courts apply the best interests
of the child standard to assign custody. 244 Where the suit is be-
tween a biological parent and a third party, courts rarely examine
the best interests of the child unless the biological parent is found
to be unfit. 245 Thus, in that situation, the biological parent's con-
240. Gloria Christopherson, Minnesota Developments, Minnesota Adopts a Best
Interests Standard in Parental Rights Termination Proceedings: In re J.J.B., 71
MINN. L. REv. 1263, 1272 (1987) (citations omitted); see Elizabeth P. Miller, De-
Boer v. Schmidt and Twigg v. Mays: Does the "Best Interests of the Child" Stan-
dard Protect the Best Interests of Children?, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 497, 509 (1994)
(questioning the efficacy of the best interests of the child standard). Many state
statutes do not specify factors to be considered in determining the child's best in-
terests. See Christopherson, supra, at 1272.
241. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 207 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Wis.
1973).
242. Under the "least detrimental alternative" standard, the focus of the court's
inquiry is on the child's need for stable and continuous relationships and the
child's sense of time "based on the urgency of the instinctual and emotional needs."
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 40, 53
(1979). This standard professes to consider "the law's incapacity to supervise in-
terpersonal relationships and the limits of knowledge to make long-range predic-
tions." Id. at 49.
Alternatively, characterizing the child's interest as a right to be nurtured may
help in identifying the values that are important in choosing the appropriate per-
son to whom to grant custody. See Cahn, supra note 111, at 57.
243. "What is psychologically least detrimental will usually be no more deter-
minate for expert and nonexpert alike than what is in a child's best interests; and
to reframe the question in a way that invites predictions based on the use of labels
and terminology developed for treatment is both demeaning to the expert and cor-
rupting for the judicial process." Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226,
287 (1975).
244. See Cahn, supra note 111, at 9-10; Swindell, supra note 127, at 675.
245. See Swindell, supra note 127, at 676; see, e.g., In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d
649, 666 (Mich. 1993) (refusing to consider the interests of the child because there
was no showing that the biological parents were unfit). A few states use the best
interests doctrine to determine custody in disputes between legal parents and
third parties. See supra note 237 (citing various jurisdictions that use the best in-
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stitutional rights regarding parenting prevail over any interests
the child may have in the custody dispute.
Although children have some constitutional rights, 246 those
rights are limited. In family law, children's rights are generally
defined indirectly through prohibitions on parental behavior or on
a recognition of the child's dependence; 247 such rights include the
right to adequate physical care, education and protection from
harm inflicted by a child's parent.248
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 249 established that the rights of a
child do not include a liberty interest in maintaining a filial rela-
tionship with a biological parent who is not the child's legal par-
ent.250 The Michael H. Court concluded that the daughter of an
unwed father, whose mother was married to another man, did not
have a constitutionally-protected interest in maintaining a filial
relationship with her biological father. 25 1 The Court explained
that to grant her claim would mean that she would have two le-
gally-recognized fathers because the Court held that her mother's
husband was her legal father. 252 Her Due Process claim failed be-
cause a child cannot have two legally-recognized fathers.253
terests doctrine in custody disputes between legal parents and third parties).
Under the parental-rights doctrine, a fit parent "has a right to the custody,
care, and companionship of his or her child even if the interests of the child would
be better served by being placed with a third party." Hill, supra note 48, at 363.
The majority of state courts follow the presumption of the Supreme Court that
parents act in the best interests of their children. See Miller, supra note 240, at
512; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (recognizing a presump-
tion that parents act in the best interests of their children); cf. In re J.P., 648 P.2d
1364 (Utah 1982) (finding unconstitutional an application of the best interests of
the child standard in terminating parental rights). Children's interests, however,
often conflict with those of their parents. See Miller, supra note 240, at 510.
246. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (holding that a child may be
required to seek the consent of a court, but not of her parents, to obtain an abor-
tion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that the right
to use contraceptives applies to children); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (extending the protection of the First Amendment
to children); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a child must be provided
with the basic Due Process protections available to adult criminal defendants if the
court proceeding may result in the child's confinement).
247. See VINCENT DE FRANCIS, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: BALANCING
THE EQUITIES 9 (1971).
248. See id.
249. 491 U.S. 110 (1988).
250. See id. at 130-3 1.
251. See id. The child brought an Equal Protection challenge in addition to her
Due Process claim. See id. at 131. Applying the rational basis test, the Court de-
nied her Equal Protection challenge. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id. There is no basis in history or tradition for the contention that a
child may have two fathers. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 250-51
(stating that a child does not have a liberty interest in having both a biological and
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Despite the Court's failure to consider the child's interests in
assigning paternal rights in Michael H., it did not hold that a
child's interests cannot be used in the determination of a child's
legal parents. Rather, its rationale in making the determination of
paternal parentage was grounded in the state's interest in pro-
tecting the marital unit.254 This interest is not implicated in the
context of collaborative reproduction as it was in Michael H. where
the child was the product of marital infidelity.255 Thus, in the con-
text of collaborative reproduction, Michael H. does not foreclose
consideration of the child's interests in assigning parental rights.
In Quilloin v. Walcott,256 the trial court applied the best in-
terests standard in deciding that an unwed father did not have pa-
rental rights. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the application of
the best interests standard to determine paternity. 257 Determining
maternity when there are two biological mothers is similar to de-
termining paternity when the father is unwed because in both
situations the parents may not possess all of the elements of par-
enthood. 258 Therefore, applying the best interests standard to de-
termine legal maternity is consistent with Quilloin.
In a dissenting opinion in Johnson, Justice Kennard argued
that the best interests of the child test should be the standard for
determining maternity in the context of collaborative reproduc-
tion. 259 The majority rejected this standard, arguing its applica-
tion is unauthorized "governmental interference" into private mat-
ters and "confuses concepts of parentage and custody."260
Justice Kennard countered the majority's first argument by
emphasizing that when the court grants review to determine who
is the legal mother, it puts itself in the center of the controversy. 261
In response to the majority's second point, she argued that the best
interests of the child standard is the most appropriate standard for
determining parentage in the context of collaborative reproduc-
a legal father).
254. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131.
255. See id.
256. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
257. See id. at 254.
258. Compare supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (describing the three
elements of motherhood) with supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text
(explaining that the two elements of fatherhood are biology and personal relation-
ship).
259. See 851 P.2d 776, 799 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 782 n.10.
261. Id. at 799 n.4 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ('Judicial resolution of family law
matters, by its nature, necessarily involves some governmental interference in
what would otherwise be private concerns.").
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tion.262 This is because the distribution of parental rights and du-
ties affects the child's welfare and the best interests standard is
frequently applied when the child's welfare is at issue.2 63 Finally,
Justice Kennard noted that the majority did not explain why the
best interests standard is inappropriate for the determination of
maternal parentage.264
In applying the best interests standard, depending on the age
of the child,265 the bond that the child has developed with the fam-
ily with whom he or she is living is more important in the context
of collaborative reproduction than in the context of divorce. It is
essentially adoption when a child of collaborative reproduction
must leave his or her home and move in with parents who are
complete strangers. Adopted children are at a greater risk of ex-
periencing "emotional, behavioral, and educational problems" than
non-adopted children.266 Regardless of which parent gets custody
262. See id. at 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting). One major counterargument to
applying this test in the case of a surrogate arrangement involves the financial
resources of the parties. Surrogates are frequently less wealthy than the genetic
parents and financial well-being may be a significant determinant in one's ability
to provide for the child. See Irwin, supra note 235, at 1291. In the context of col-
laborative reproduction and misappropriated ova or embryos, however, neither the
genetic nor gestational mother is consistently wealthier than the other. Thus, it is
doubtful that this factor will consistently work against one of the biological moth-
ers as it does a surrogate. Additionally, other factors not as dependent upon
wealth will be considered under this standard; specifically, the ability to physically
and psychologically nurture the child, to provide ethical and intellectual guidance
and to provide stability and continuity will be considered. See Johnson, 851 P.2d
at 800 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
263. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
264. See id. at 799 n.4.
265. The degree of the harm the child suffers will likely be a function of his or
her age at the time he or she is removed from the home to live with an unknown
family. See ANu R. SHARMA ET AL., The Emotional and Behavioral Adjustment of
United States Adopted Adolescents: Part II. Age at Adoption, in 18 CHILDREN AND
YOUTH SERVICES REVIEW 101, 110 (1996) (finding that "as age [of the child] at
adoption increases, behavioral and emotional adjustment of adoptees decreases");
see also id. (noting that "adoption of a child anywhere in the age range of 2-10
years will yield relatively the same levels of psychological adjustment in adoles-
cence").
266. See David M. Brodzinsky et al., Psychological and Academic Adjustment in
Adopted Children, 52 J. CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 582, 587 (1984); see
also David M. Brodzinsky et al., Prevalence of Clinically Significant Symptoinatol-
ogy in a Nonclinical Sample of Adopted and Nonadopted Children, 16 J. CLINICAL
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 350, 353 (1987) (finding an "increased psychological risk asso-
ciated with adoption" and noting that "[a]doptees are especially vulnerable in ar-
eas related to externalizing symptomatology (e.g. hyperactivity and aggression)");
Sotiris Kotsopoulos et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Adopted Children: A Controlled
Study, 58 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 608, 610 (1988) (noting that "the rate of refer-
ral to child psychiatric services is higher for adopted than for nonadopted children
and adolescents"); Byron W. Lindholm & John Touliatos, Psychological Adjustment
of Adopted and Nonadopted Children, 46 PSYCHOL. REPORTS 307, 307 (finding
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of the child, the child of divorce will probably experience less
stress 267 than the child of collaborative reproduction who is
"adopted."268 While no studies directly support this conclusion, it
is a logical one because the child of collaborative reproduction, un-
like the child of divorce, is not likely to have an existing relation-
ship with the parent(s) with whom he or she may live.
III. Discussion
Procreative rights provide a vague standard for defining who
is a procreator. Even if collaborative reproduction falls within the
right to procreate, as can be argued from the vague wording of
Carey v. Population Services International,269 this right does not
greater "frequency of disorder, especially conduct problems but also personality
problems and socialized delinquency" among adopted children compared to
nonadopted children); Ellen L. Lipman et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Adopted
Children: A Profile from the Ontario Child Health Study, 37 CANADIAN J.
PSYCHIATRY 627, 632 (1992) ("Adoption is a significant marker for psychiatric dis-
order and poor school performance in boys. Adoption in girls 12 to 16 years old is a
significant marker for substance abuse."). But cf. M. Bohman & S. Sigvardsson, A
Prospective, Longitudinal Study of Children Registered for Adoption, 61 ACTA
PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 339, 354 (1980) ("Our results indicate that the risks
concerning the subsequent development of adopted children are in no way greater
than the risks for children in the general population, provided that the adoptive
homes are of a good standard and well prepared for the task of rearing a non-
biological child."); James K. Mikawa & John A. Boston, Jr., Psychological Charac-
teristics ofAdopted Children, 42 PSYCHIATRIC Q. SUPP. 274, 278 (1968) (concluding
that "adoption itself does not necessarily result in systematic changes in personal-
ity structure").
267. When a child's parents divorce, the child may suffer many negative effects
including feelings of unhappiness, anger and rejection, poor school performance,
psychological illness, a greater tendency to commit crime, suicidal thoughts, an
increased likelihood of being the father or mother of a child born out of wedlock,
negative effects on adult work performance and difficulty in trusting others and in
forming stable, lasting relationships. See ANN MITCHELL, CHILDREN IN THE
MIDDLE: LIVING THROUGH DIVORCE 88-96 (1985); William A- Galston, Braking Di-
vorce for the Sake of Children, AM. ENTERPRISE, May/June 1996, at 36. But see
Lyn Taylor et al., Parental Divorce and Its Effects on the Quality of Intimate Rela-
tionships in Adulthood, 24 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 181, 199 (1995) (concluding
from a study of 146 adults from divorced and intact families that "parental divorce
of itself does not necessarily increase the chance of poor quality intimate relation-
ships in adulthood ... when parental divorce is not significantly associated with
any decrement in maternal care"). Some studies indicate that not all children are
significantly affected by divorce. See, e.g. Karl Zinmeister, Divorce's Toll on Chil-
dren, AM. ENTERPRISE, May/June 1996, at 39, 41 (discussing a study which con-
cluded that three out of 16 children were unchanged by divorce).
268. The stress that a child undergoes in a divorce may be different than the
stress a child experiences when he or she is removed from both parents and possi-
bly all familiar surroundings, such as school and friends. Nonetheless, common
sense suggests that there is a greater potential that a child in the latter situation
will undergo more stress than a child in the former situation regardless of whether
the impact of that stress is long term.
269. 431 U.S. 678 (1977); see supra text accompanying note 96 (suggesting that
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provide clear standards for determining which participants are
procreators.
First, collaborative reproduction extends the normal ideas of
artificial reproduction. In re Baby M. is an example of the most
traditional method of artificial reproduction: artificial insemina-
tion. The Baby M. court stated that a surrogate, who was artifi-
cially inseminated, exercised the right to procreate.270 Whether
the right to procreate also protects collaborative reproduction,
which further extends ideas of reproduction in that it involves the
gametes of two people and the womb of a third,2 71 has not been ad-
dressed by the courts.272
If collaborative reproduction is part of the right to procreate,
several complicated issues arise. Whether the right to procreate
would attach to one or all of the participants in collaborative re-
production is unclear. Additionally, Baby M. and scholars suggest
that at least some parental rights flow from the right to procre-
ate. 273 Conflict is inevitable if two or more participants of collabo-
rative reproduction are procreators, and they attempt to exercise
parental rights stemming from the right to procreate.
Second, the right to procreate seems tied to biological ele-
ments of parenthood. The right to procreate focuses on gestational
and genetic elements. 274 Whether one or both of these elements
would be an exercise of the right to procreate is not readily appar-
ent. The focus on biology to the exclusion of the parents' intent to
produce the child suggests that adoptive parents who create a
child through sperm, ova and uterus donation have not exercised
the right to procreate, while the respective donors may have.
If collaborative reproduction is not an exercise of the right
to procreate, then no parental rights automatically attach to the
participants/donors. The courts must look to the elements of par-
enthood or other factors to determine legal maternity. As dis-
cussed earlier, the Johnson intent test is unworkable in the situa-
tion of stolen ova because both mothers intended to raise the
child.275 Additionally, neither the genetic nor the gestational test
should be used, regardless of whether stolen ova are involved, for
this interpretation of the Carey decision is plausible).
270. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1256-61 (N.J. 1987); supra text accompa-
nying note 74.
271. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
272. See Chin, supra note 62, at 202-03 (stating that the Supreme Court has not
decided this issue).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68, 70-77.
274. See supra text accompanying note 103.
275. See supra introduction to Part II.
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two reasons. First, although both standards present compelling
arguments emphasizing the importance of genetics and gestation
to the parent-child relationship, neither presents a strong ration-
ale for dismissing the other standard.276 Second, the remaining
arguments supporting these standards are essentially claims that
the mother's genetic or gestational contribution to the child creates
a property right in the child.277 Doctrines that focus on the adult's
physical contribution to the child in assigning rights with respect
to the child injure children as a class. 278  These doctrines
"overvalue procreation and undervalue nurture, at a time when
nurture is in very short supply."279
The child's interests should be paramount in the determina-
tion of which biological mother will raise the child. The child's
welfare is at stake, much more so than the mothers'. 280 Given that
a custody battle often occurs during the child's developmental
years, the result will permanently affect the child much more pro-
foundly than the competing parents. 28 1 If the child's interests are
not at the forefront, there is no guarantee that the child's interests
will be fully protected. In light of these concerns and the inade-
quacy of the genetic and gestational standards, the best interests
of the child standard should be used in assigning parental rights in
the situation of the Jorges.28 2
Applying the best interests of the child standard is consistent
with the general rule that it applies only when the claims of both
parties are equal. 283 If collaborative reproduction constitutes exer-
276. See supra Parts II.A., II.B.
277. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text (explaining the argument
that property rights in genetic material equal parental rights); supra text accom-
panying notes 221-23 (explaining that the gestational mother's argument for ma-
ternity based on her physical contribution is essentially a property rights argu-
ment). In re Clausen is a prime example of a child being treated as a possession.
In that case, the court failed to consider the child's interests in a custody battle
between her adoptive and biological parents. See Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.
1993); supra note 243 and accompanying text (explaining that a child's interest is
generally only considered upon the finding that a biological parent is unfit).
278. See Woodhouse, supra note 110, at 114.
279. Id.
280. See supra note 267 (illustrating how a child manifests various emotional
reactions to divorce).
281. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (describing the impact that di-
vorce has on children).
282. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances
leading up to Loretta and Bacilli Jorge's custody suit for the twins born after Mrs.
Jorge's eggs were implanted in another woman); see also supra text accompanying
note 263 (explaining that the best interests of the child standard is most fre-
quently applied when the child's welfare is debated).
283. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text (discussing when courts use
1998]
Law and Inequality
cising the right to procreate, 284 then both mothers have the paren-
tal rights that the right to procreate entails: at the least, the right
to a continuing relationship with the child. 285 Their claims to par-
entage stemming from the right to procreate are equal. If collabo-
rative reproduction is not an exercise of the right to procreate,
then no parental rights are automatically attached to either
mother. The court must then look to the elements of parent-
hood.286 Because each mother manifests two elements of parent-
hood, intent/social and either genetics or gestation, each has an
equally strong claim to be recognized as the child's parent. 287
The only way to avoid treating the child as a possession is to
recognize and give value to the child's relationship with both bio-
logical mothers. Under a multiple parents approach, the rights as-
sociated with parental status are distributed among the individu-
als who have a genetic or gestational tie to the child. 288 Although
the law recognizes only one mother and father for each child, 289 in
the context of collaborative reproduction, both science and the
child recognize that he or she has two biological mothers and one
biological father. Recognizing this reality, the best interests of the
child standard should be applied so that one mother is declared
the "legal mother." This woman will have all the rights of a legal
parent with one exception: if it is established that it is in the best
interests of the child to have a personal relationship with the non-
custodial mother, she shall have visitation rights only. To give the
non-custodial mother decisional authority over the child is an un-
workable solution that could cause more discord for the child in
the best interests of the child standard in custody disputes).
284. This conclusion assumes that the right to procreate exists independent of
sexual intercourse and that two of the three elements of procreation are sufficient
to invoke Due Process protections. See supra Part I.B.l.b (analyzing whether col-
laborative reproduction is an exercise of the right to procreate).
285. See supra Part I.B.l.a (exploring whether the right to procreate includes
parental rights). Both mothers cannot exercise all the rights with respect to the
child. Although the best interests standard is generally not applied to determine
who is a legally-recognized parent, there is no other way to make this determina-
tion equitably.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04 (identifying the three elements
from which parental rights are derived).
287. This statement assumes that neither the gestational nor genetic relation-
ship alone provides a superior claim to parenthood. See supra notes 133-54 and
accompanying text (discussing cases which found custody claims based on genetics
and gestation to be equal); supra text accompanying note 276 (noting that neither
the gestation nor the genetic standard presents a strong rationale for dismissing
the other standard).
288. See Cahn, supra note 111, at 44.
289. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1988); supra notes 249-53
and accompanying text (summarizing Michael H. and the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of the idea of a child having two legal fathers).
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many cases. By contrast, the limited right of visitation would not
significantly curtail the parental rights of the custodial mother.
A factor in determining whether the noncustodial mother
should have visitation rights is the ability of the parties to cooper-
ate with each other. If the custodial parents are hostile to the
prospect of an adult outside their family unit visiting the child,
then the child who would otherwise be in a stable and caring envi-
ronment may experience significant stress.290 The consideration of
the degree and the effects of stress and whether the benefits of
visitation would outweigh this stress may result in the non-
custodial mother not being involved in the child's life. While this
result may seem inequitable for the noncustodial mother, her in-
terests should yield to those of the child because the child's welfare
is at stake.291 Further, there is no evidence that the child will un-
dergo any type of psychological or emotional damage because he or
she did not form a bond with the genetic parent, the woman most
likely to be the non-custodial mother.292
Although the Supreme Court clearly stated that parental
rights will only be given to one mother and one father,293 two ar-
guments suggest that it should find the above proposal to be con-
sistent with this rule. First, there are situations in which the pa-
rental right to visitation is given to a third party. Some states, for
instance, grant grandparents the right to visit their grandchil-
dren. 294 Additionally, in an open adoption, the biological mother
retains the right to visit the child, but exercises no other rights.295
Second, both mothers demonstrate elements of maternity that,
290. In discussing whether court-ordered visitation between a child and her
grandparents is in the best interests of the child, one commentator noted that "[ilt
is difficult to comprehend how legally imposed visitation with the grandparents...
could be in the child's best interest when the visitation places the child in the mid-
dle of an emotional minefield.., especially.., when ... the child has not had con-
tact with the grandparents and does not have a close, psychologically beneficial
relationship with them." Jackson, supra note 131, at 580.
291. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text (describing the impact that
adoption and divorce have on a child).
292. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (explaining that the difference
in the attachment a child may feel toward a genetic parent versus an adoptive
parent is unremarkable); see also supra note 179 (noting that proponents who ar-
gue that the child will suffer psychologically confuse the concept of self-identity
with knowledge of biological heritage).
293. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131. The Court explained that there is no basis
in history or tradition for the concept that a child could have multiple fathers. See
id. at 131.
294. See supra note 131 (discussing the exclusivity of parental rights and excep-
tions to this principle).
295. See supra note 131 (describing open adoptions and identifying them as an
exception to the traditional concept of exclusive parental rights).
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based on the standards of history and tradition, 296 were key in de-
termining parentage. 297 The Court's acceptance of this proposal
may hinge on whether the right to visitation is framed as a paren-
tal right and whether the recipient of this right is deemed a
mother. There is no reason that it should be characterized as a
parental right, nor is it necessary for the noncustodial "mother" to
be recognized as a second mother. The important point is that the
child's relationship to each woman is protected.
In light of the potential impact on the child's development
and emotional stress of being separated from the only parent(s)
the child knows, 298 once the child establishes a bond with one
mother, 299 the court should adopt a presumption in favor of
granting parental custody to the mother who is the caretaker. In
most cases, the presumption will favor the gestational mother.
30 0
If a child develops a bond with the caretaker/mother during time
spent litigating custody issues, the presumption should remain.
As in the case of Baby Jessica in In re Clausen,30 1 a child's devel-
opment and emotional attachment to his or her caretaker(s) does
not freeze in time when a custody suit is filed.30 2
To rebut the presumption, the non-caretaker mother should
be required to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence,
30 3
that the child will be harmed by remaining with his or her care-
taker. To demonstrate this, the non-caretaker must show that the
harm in uprooting the child from the only family he or she knows
to live with a stranger is outweighed by the benefits to the child of
296. The Supreme Court has indicated that ideas relating to parentage should
have a basis in history and tradition. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131.
297. See supro notes 211-14 and accompanying text (examining methods of
proving motherhood under both common law and current law).
298. See supra note 267 (discussing emotional responses of children in divorce
situations).
299. This generally occurs when the child is approximately three months old.
See supra note 227.
300. In the event there is an adoptive mother, the presumption will most likely
favor her.
301. 502 N.W.2d 649 (1993).
302. See supra text accompanying note 165 (noting that the child lived with the
prospective adoptive parents during the two-year custody battle).
303. The preponderance of the evidence standard "requires the trier of fact 'to
believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before
[the judge] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the
[judge] of the fact's existence."' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Courts should use this standard of
proof rather than a clear and convincing standard in an attempt to balance the
child's interest in being unnecessarily removed from the home with his or her in-
terest in being removed from a harmful environment that cannot be demonstrated
under the more demanding clear and convincing standard.
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living with the non-caretaker. If the non-caretaker makes this
showing, then the burden of proof will shift to the caretaker, who
must demonstrate that it is in the child's best interests to remain
with her. In the event that the court finds the presumption to be
rebutted and declares the non-caretaker to be the legal mother,
the former caretaker should have visitation rights if it is in the
best interests of the child.
Without a bond between the child and the gestational
mother, there is no tenable argument to support a presumption
granting parental rights to the gestational mother. 304 Thus, in this
situation, which will likely occur before the child is born or when
he or she is very young, the best interests of the child shall deter-
mine which mother is the legally-recognized mother.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis evidences the complexity in deter-
mining legal maternity between two women when the biological
aspects of maternity, genetics and gestation are separated. Courts
have not yet addressed the issue of artificial reproduction and the
exercise of the right to procreate. There is an increasing need for
legal standards that will best protect children, as tens of thou-
sands of children will be created by artificial reproduction.
To resolve the legal maternity dispute, courts generally ex-
amine the three aspects of motherhood among the two women: in-
tent/social, genetics and gestation. While the Johnson intent
standard is the most functional, it is unworkable in the situation of
stolen or mistakenly-used ova because both mothers exhibit the
intent/social element. The genetic standard applied by Belsito v.
Clark30 5 is undesirable because it treats children like possessions.
At the core of the genetic standard is the proposition that the ge-
netic mother's property rights in her gametes translate into paren-
tal rights in the child. The gestational test is supported by a
similar rationale: the gestator's physical contribution to the child's
development translates into parental rights. In both cases, the
property or labor of the mother purports to give each mother "title"
to the child.
Both the genetic and gestational standards are supported by
evidence indicating that a child is psychologically and developmen-
tally benefited by maintaining a relationship with each mother. In
304. See discussion supra Part II.B (examining the gestational standard for as-
signing parental rights).
305. 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1994).
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contrast, neither standard establishes that the child's bonding
with one mother instead of the other clearly benefits the child or
that the child will be significantly harmed by not having a rela-
tionship with either the genetic or gestational mother.
Instead of focusing on which mother has a better claim to
the child, the focus should be on which mother would be best for
the child. An inquiry into the best interests of the child elevates
the debate from abstract ideas about what makes a mother a
mother and focuses the inquiry on the person who will be most af-
fected by this decision: the child. A rebuttable presumption that
the mother who is the child's caretaker is the legal mother, most
likely the gestational or adoptive mother, will minimize the risk of
removing the child from the only parent(s) that he or she knows.
By adopting the best interests of the child standard as the test for
determining legal maternity in collaborative reproduction cases,
the interests of children will no longer be subverted by the claims
of the competing mothers.
335
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice was
founded sixteen years ago as an alternative to existing legal litera-
ture that did not sufficiently examine problems of inequality. The
founding editors sought to provide a forum for legal scholarship
and for underrepresented views and voices that analyzed the law's
perpetuation of systemic oppression, exploitation and discrimina-
tion.
The current members of Law & Inequality are committed to
the Journal's original mission of providing a place for pieces that
confront inequality in a variety of ways and from different per-
spectives. We offer the following pieces in keeping with that mis-
sion.
[I]t is obvious that if a man is entered at the starting line in a
race three hundred years after another man, the first would
have to perform some impossible feat in order to catch up with
his fellow runner.
-Martin Luther King, Jr.'
1. WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 134 (1964).
